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## **THESIS**

A FORMAL PROTOCOL TEST PROCEDURE FOR THE SURVIVABLE ADAPTABLE FIBER OPTIC EMBEDDED NETWORK (SAFENET)

by

Wayne High

March 1993

Thesis Advisor:

G. M. Lundy

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#### A FORMAL PROTOCOL TEST PROCEDURE FOR THE SURVIVABLE ADAPTABLE FIBER OPTIC EMBEDDED NETWORK (SAFENET)

by
Wayne High
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S. Computer Science, University of South Carolina, 1986

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
#### **ABSTRACT**

This thesis focuses upon a new method for verifying the correct operation of a complex, high speed fiber optic communication network. These networks are of growing importance to the military because of their increased connectivity, survivability, and reconfigurability. With the introduction and increased dependence on sophisticated software and protocols, it is essential that their operation be correct. Because of the speed and complexity of fiber optic communication networks being designed today, they are becoming increasingly difficult to test. Previously, testing was accomplished by application of conformance test methods which had little connection with an implementation's specification. The major goal of conformance testing is to ensure that the implementation of a profile is consistent with its specification. Formal specification is needed to ensure that the implementation performs its intended operations while exhibiting desirable behaviors. The new conformance test method presented is based upon the System of Communicating Machine model which uses a formal protocol specification of the implementation to generate a test sequence.

The major contribution of this thesis is the application of the System of Communicating Machine model to formal profile specifications of the Survivable Adaptable Fiber Optic Embedded Network (SAFENET) standard which results in the derivation of test sequences for a SAFENET profile. The results of applying this new method to SAFENET's OSI and

Lightweight profiles are presented.

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#### I. INTRODUCTION

#### A. PURPOSE

The Survivable Adaptable Fiber Optic Embedded Network (SAFENET) is part of the United States Navy's Next Generation Computer Resources (NGCR) program and represents an effort to meet the data transfer demands of current and future naval shipboard mission critical computer systems through development of standard computer network profiles. SAFENET represents a Local Area Network (LAN) grouping of standards, encompassing the seven ISO/OSI model layers. SAFENET is a program being researched and developed by a joint Navy-Industry working group to formulate standard commercial network methods to fit the requirements of the Navy's various combat platforms. Whenever possible, the joint working group intends to select well developed industry standards. The Navy's NGCR team is chartered to investigate methods for future shipboard hardware and software development to meet the Navy's requirements of survivability, increased connectivity, performance and future system growth capabilities [GREE89] [HDBK92]. SAFENET is an effort to meet the needs of current and future systems used aboard the Navy's combat ships, submarines, and aircraft.

Over the course of time, network designers learned that ambiguous rules can trigger undesirable sequences of events which can have adverse effects on the best design; therefore, it is essential that communication networks and their protocols be adequately tested. Entire networks, with possibly hundreds or even thousands of attached computers can be rendered essentially useless by a faulty protocol or profile. With every passing day our society is becoming more dependent on communication networks and their protocols. Consequently, with so many lives and costly equipment at stake it is imperative to test these profiles and protocols to ensure that they perform as intended. This thesis presents a conformance test method that is based upon earlier work [MILL90]. In this thesis, the conformance test method utilized is based upon a formal specification. In addition,

applications of the test method using real world SAFENET profiles as examples will be demonstrated.

#### B. BACKGROUND

Currently, in the Navy, computers are usually found configured in point-to-point interfaces. However, the growing trend of distributed architectures in modern naval combat systems requires a greater degree of system integration than present point-to-point interfaces can support. As a result, the SAFENET standards are being developed to solve communications connectivity and system integration problems by providing the shipboard computers with the capability to communicate with multiple devices and application programs over a single Input/Output port through the use of a computer network and to provide future system growth capacity.

To ensure that the elements of a complex communications network such as SAFENET communicate reliably once the system has been implemented, the protocols of the system should be verified against all system design requirements. In this manner, instances of incompleteness in a protocol specification can be located using protocol verification techniques. Provided formal specifications have been done, conformance testing is an essential step to ensuring accomplishment of intended functions without error. Effectively testing protocols with other software and hardware systems presents a difficult problem. Conformance testing's major goal is to ensure that the implementation of the protocol is consistent with its specification. Therefore, it is highly advantageous that the specification be expressed in a formal model that has been formally verified. A recent paper by Miller [MILL90], pointed out the developing rift between specification and verification, and between these two and conformance testing. Protocol models, designed for specification purposes, tend to have powerful program language constructs, which simplify specification but leads to a higher degree of verification and analysis difficulty. The Communicating Finite State Machine (CFSM) model is too simple for the specification of modern, complex

protocols because this protocol model is designed primarily with analysis in mind [LUND91].

#### C. CONTENTS

This thesis attempts to bridge the gap between SAFENET specification and testing. Assuming that all SAFENET protocols are not available in a form convenient for testing, simplifying the difficulty associated with verification, analysis and testing, we start from a protocol model called Systems of Communicating Machines (SCM). A procedure is presented for the generation of a test sequence for a protocol specified in terms of the SAFENET model. Then, the SAFENET procedure is used to generate a test sequence for a SAFENET protocol implementation.

The testing of any complex software is known to be a difficult problem, and this certainly applies to the testing of SAFENET protocols. Because SAFENET protocols are critical to so many systems, it is a problem which cannot be avoided or ignored. The procedure presented in this thesis does not detect all errors or combinations of errors. Only exhaustive testing can accomplish this, but substantial resources are required. The approach does, however represent an attempt to exercise a portion of a SAFENET protocol machine, thereby providing some assurance that the implementation fulfills its purpose.

Presently, there are two standards under development SAFENET I and SAFENET II. This thesis focuses on SAFENET II which uses the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Fiber Distributed Data Interface (FDDI) LAN that operates at 100 Mbps. In the following chapter the FDDI standard is discussed. In Chapter III, the SAFENET Draft Standard is discussed followed by Chapter IV, which discusses problems found in the SAFENET Draft Standard. In Chapter V, the testing of fiber optic links is discussed. In Chapter VI, the test procedure is applied to the SAFENET protocol. The final chapter summarizes the thesis.

#### II. FDDI BACKGROUND

The FDDI standard is focused on the comprehensive implementation of communications through fiber optics; with fiber optics, information is passed through modulated beams of light on glass fiber rather than the more antiquated electronic pulses on copper wire. In large backbone Local Area Networks (LANs), FDDI has several advantages over copper wire. Fiber is oblivious to lightening strikes, to the Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP) phenomenon associated with nuclear detonations and to their resultant current surges that can damage connected equipment and cause safety hazards. Furthermore, fiber is not subject to radio or Electro-Magnetic Interference (EMI) and is generally less restrictive in its environment, requiring far less space in existing cable runs.

FDDI utilizes two counter-rotating token rings. The typical FDDI configuration has the primary ring carrying data and the secondary ring being used for automatic bypass and recovery (Figure 1). Current networks in service are generally comprised of CSMA/CD protocols, which limit transmission rates to 10 Mbps, shorter cable runs, and rapidly decreasing efficiency as the network load increases because of data collision resolution. The use of a ring topology offers the advantage of data collision elimination, which provides for very high effective data rates. Unlike CSMA/CD topologies (such as Ethernet), FDDI's performance does not degrade significantly with increased levels of traffic, up to 95% of its rated capacity. FDDI networks can bypass hardware failures. When a node or link fails, the two counter rotating paths wrap together around the fault thus allowing continued communications. Any fault on FDDI dual rings can be isolated, keeping the remainder of the rings completely active. When the fault is corrected the fiber optic ring reconfigures automatically. This ability to adapt to breaks or node failures helps ensure reliability of the system and data availability in transfer.




Figure 1 Typical FDDI configuration

A special bit pattern, called a token, is continuously circulated by the FDDI ring. Stations transmit data by capturing the token, transmitting their traffic, and sending the token to the next station on the network until a complete circuit is made. FDDI supports two types of traffic transmissions: synchronous and asynchronous. Synchronous service is designed for applications with predictable bandwidths and critical response times. Asynchronous services are designed for applications with bursty, widely varying bandwidth requirements. To accommodate asynchronous, "non-deterministic" traffic a Target Token Rotation Time (TTRT) is defined and negotiated during ring initialization. Each station maintains the same value for TTRT. Each station's Token Rotation Timer (TRT) is initialized to TTRT when enabled. The TRT counts down until TRT = 0 and is then reset to TTRT. The variable Late Count (LC) is initialized to zero (LC = 0) and is

incremented each time TRT reaches zero. In this manner, the Late Count counter records the number of times TRT has expired since the token was last received by a designated station. If TRT does not reach zero and LC is zero, the token is considered to have arrived early. When a station receives the token early, after transmitting any synchronous frames, it may transmit asynchronous frames for a period not to exceed the remaining TRT. Once the allotment of asynchronous frames are transmitted, the token is passed to the next station and both TRT and LC are reinitialized [STAL88]. Synchronous traffic is "deterministic" because each station is guaranteed token service within a specified time limit and for a specified allocation. In the event that a station has asynchronous, "non-deterministic" traffic to transmit, upon receipt of the token the station, first, transmits any synchronous traffic up to its allocation; then, if there is time remaining as the result of an early token arrival due to decreased synchronous allocation usage or if excess bandwidth is present, the asynchronous traffic will be transmitted.

Utilizing FDDI as the backbone LAN offers other advantages. In addition to satisfying the need of connecting LANS together without compromising inter-LAN speed, FDDI offers capability that will enable future technologies, including circuit switching. Like most networks, FDDI is a packet switched network, utilizing FDDI packets to facilitate the efficient transmission of data in various sizes. FDDI frames vary in length, have their own delimiting start and end markers, and contain their own destination addresses (Figure 2). By using an upward compatible extension of FDDI known as FDDI-II, FDDI gains the capability to perform circuit-switched service in addition to normal packet switching [ROSS89]. This permits future special applications which require real-time response from the network, including digital voice; rapid updating of tactical displays in battle may be another application. Ross describes the circuit switched connection as a "data stream," which provides for the transmission of continuous (analog) data.

Preamble	Starting Delimiter	Control	Desti- nation Address	Address	Information Field	Frame Check Sequence	Ending Delimiter	Frame Status
64bits	8bits	8bits	16 or 48 bits	16 or 48 bits	< 4500octets	32bits	4bits	4bits

Figure 2 FDDI Frame Format

FDDI rings support two types of stations: dual attach stations (DAS), which attach directly to the ring, and single attach stations (SAS), such as PC's and work stations. Each DAS has four fiber connections, two to receive and transmit on the primary ring, and two to receive and transmit on the secondary ring. A typical DAS can be a concentrator, bridge, router, server, minicomputer or mainframe. Multiple DASs are linked together to form the network backbone. A SAS can be immediately isolated in case of fault detection without disrupting traffic on the ring.

In a distributed network environment, all the DASs in a FDDI ring participate in network capability, fault recovery, management, and network initialization. Internal DAS timers and logic control resolution of all ring failures provide bypass handling. Therefore, the counter-rotating ring topology allows the network to continue functioning in the event that either a node or link is lost. It is this survivability, in addition to its very high bandwidth, that makes FDDI most suitable to a battle environment. Optical fiber minimizes interference and signal degradation, and minimizes signal loss over long cable runs. Due to the extremely large bandwidth of fiber, bit-serial transmission may be used, offering the advantage of hardware simplicity, decreased complexity, and increased reliability [ROSS89]. Reliability is a key factor for the Navy in both normal peacetime operations and while at battle. This interest in reliability and communications connectivity led to the development effort of Survivable Adaptable Fiber Optic Embedded Network (SAFENET).

	Ap	plication Inter	face			
OSI LAYER	FTAM Directory CMISE		S	Lightweight Application Services		SAFENET
7	Application Layer Services					USER
	ACSE ROSE	E) SMASE	S			SERVICES
OSI LAYER 6	ISO Presentation			Null Layers		
OSI LAYER 5	ISO Session					
	Transfer	Services Inter	face			
OSI LAYER 4	ISO CO Transport	ISO CL Transport			XPRESS Transfer Protocol	SAFENET TRANSFER
OSI LAYER	ISO ES/IS	SERVICES				
	ISO/IEI	EE Logical Lin	k Co	ontrol		
OSI LAYER						
2	FI	SAFENET				
OSI LAYER	LOCA	LAN SERVICES				
	SAFENE					

Figure 3 SAFENET Protocol Profile

#### III. SAFENET BACKGROUND

SAFENET is based on the FDDI token-ring standard and incorporates profiles for both ISO compatibility and real time performance. By employing the seven layer ISO reference model for Open Systems Interconnection (OSI), SAFENET specifies protocols at each layer of this model, defining the complete SAFENET profile. In SAFENET, this protocol profile is organized in two ways: by service partitions and by defined profiles.

#### A. SERVICE PARTITIONS

The first method of SAFENET's communicating architecture divides the protocol profile into three service partitions: user services, transfer services, and LAN services. Each of these partitions encompasses a portion of the seven layers of the ISO reference model. Figure 3 delineates the seven layers of the ISO reference model on the left, the major elements of the SAFENET profile in the center, and the service partitions on the right. The user services partition corresponds to the session, presentation, and application layers of the ISO reference model (layers 5-7) and is that portion of the SAFENET profile in which users interact with the network. The user services partition afford SAFENET users with the capability to interact with, manage, and respond to the underlying transfer services. In the center of the SAFENET profile lies the transfer services partition. It corresponds to the network, transport and Logical Link Control (LLC) sublayer of the Data Link Layer, (layers 2-4) of the ISO reference model. Through these services reliable communication mechanisms are provided to SAFENET users. The LAN services partition is that part of the SAFENET profile which performs the actual data transfer and corresponds to the physical layer of the ISO reference model as well as the media access control sublayer of the data link layer (layers 1-2). The LAN services consist of the upload and download ability to get data on and off the physical medium in a controlled manner.

#### **B. PROTOCOL SUITES**

The second descriptive method of SAFENET communications architecture separates the protocols into defined profiles: the OSI protocol profile, lightweight protocol profile, and the combined protocol profile. As depicted in figures 4, 5, and 6, these profiles define the three distinct implementation classes permitted in SAFENET. It is not required that all stations on a given SAFENET network implement the same profiles. Each respective profile describes a specific combination of network protocols defined within SAFENET. When designing a SAFENET station, at least one of the profiles (OSI, Lightweight, and Combined profiles) must be implemented. However, network designers must ensure the presence of sufficient profiles at each station to ensure that the system meets its designed communications connectivity. Some of the services and protocols are common to all implementation classes and others are used only in the OSI or lightweight profiles. The SAFENET Time Service (STS) is required for all protocol suite implementations.

The OSI protocol suite, possessing protocols and services based upon ISO standards, provides complete OSI compliant networking services to systems which require it. The OSI protocol suite consists of Manufacturing Automation Protocol (MAP) private communications, ISO File Transfer, Access and Management (FTAM), Directory Services, Association Control Service Element (ACSE), Remote Operations Service Element (ROSE), System Management Application Service Element (SMASE), Common Management Information Service Element (CMISE), presentation and session layers, Connection-Oriented Transport Protocol (COTP), ISO Connectionless Transport Protocol (CLTP) which allows the user to transmit a single unit of data, datagram, without establishing a connection, ISO Connectionless Network Protocol (CLNP) which provides services for network routing and for the segmentation and reassembly of transport layer messages that are too large for the underlying communications service, ES/IS routing exchange protocol which provides stations with the ability to associate a data link layer address with a given network layer address, IS/IS intra-domain routing protocol which dynamically determines routes to pass data between intermediate systems, LLC type 1

(connectionless) protocol and the FDDI protocols. The ISO connection oriented Transport protocol class 4 (TP4) is required within the transfer services partition [ISO870]. This is done to ensure interoperability in an open systems environment. The OSI protocol suite is basically required when either the interoperability of independently developed nodes is a driving consideration, or the file handling capabilities of FTAM are required, or increased complexity requires network management; however, it adds this capability at the expense of delayed data flow and inability to supply multiple users simultaneously [KOCH91] [PAIG90]. Figure 4 shows an overview of the OSI protocol suite.




Figure 4 Overview of the OSI Profile

In circumstances where control of timing is critical from a resource point of view, the lightweight protocol suite provides process to process message passing services. The message passing services support point to point, multicast, and remote procedure call (transaction) styles of service; however, multicast capability is limited to a single logical LAN segment [HDBK92]. The lightweight profile provides real time data transfer

capability to various systems, as well as providing added options. The lightweight protocol suite consists of lightweight application services, the Xpress Transfer Protocol (XTP), ISO CLTP, ISO CLNP, ES/IS routing exchange protocol, IS/IS intra- domain routing protocol, LLC protocol and the FDDI protocols. This profile permits implementors to develop a set of communication services which support the performance and architecture requirements of a specific system. The lightweight profile provides a limited set of network management capabilities. If this service is required then the combined protocol suite must be utilized. Finally, while this lightweight protocol suite provides fast data transfer, it does not adhere to the ISO standard protocol and therefore is very system specific [KOCH91]. Figure 5 shows an overview of the lightweight profile.




Figure 5 Overview of the Lightweight Profile




Figure 6 Overview of the Combined Profile

The combined profile is essentially the union of the OSI and lightweight protocol profiles. The combined protocol suite is intended for situations that require the capabilities of both the OSI and lightweight protocols. Therefore, all the protocols, services and capabilities of OSI and lightweight profiles are included. Additionally, network management protocols and services are provided for those protocol enrities contained within the lightweight profile. However, because of the combined capability of this suite, it

requires much more complex development energy and cost [KOCH91]. Figure 6 shows an overview of the combined profile.

#### C. SAFENET TOPOLOGY

The basic topology design for SAFENET utilizes a redundant ring structure as shown in figure 1. The critical element of SAFENET's topology is the trunk Coupling Unit (TCU). The TCU device enables a station to insert or remove itself from a network ring. The TCU is a 2x2 optical bypass switch, which is controlled by an electrical signal from the attached station. The TCU has the capability to readily isolate a failed station from the network, thereby contributing to system reliability [PAIG90]. Optical signals are transmitted in opposite directions on each of the two rings. It is clear from this redundant ring topology that accurate and timely data flow is essential to the performance of SAFENET. Accordingly, as its name implies, SAFENET uses fiber optic technology as the physical medium in which data is exchanged. Consequently, this fiber optic technology forms the backbone of SAFENET's development.

#### D. SAFENET FIBER OPTIC DEVELOPMENT

The developers of SAFENET chose to employ a newer fiber optic technology over the older copper cables. For optical cables incorporate a number of excellent properties which provide data exchange for high-capacity transmission systems [JOHN87]. A major advantage of fiber optics is the large bandwidth times distance products obtained which allow data transmission rates of up to several Gbps [LI1983]. Furthermore, today's fibers typically offer bit rates of several hundred Mbps [IFOC84] and [LUND91]. Additionally, since glass is a dielectric medium, immune to electromagnetic interference and free from sparking, these optical fibers are useful in EMI-rich and other hostile environments. Low attenuation combined with its extremely small physical dimensions make optical fibers the physical medium of choice [FINL84].

As shown in Figure 1, each network ring is composed of TCUs and connecting trunk cables. The primary and secondary ring trunk cables are intended to be physically separated to enhance survivability in the event of battle damage. This placement strategy of allowing key network components (e.g., TCU and DAS) to be separated will allow the network to absorb some damage without the entire system losing its ability to operate.

It is understood that for an active ring either a node failure or a fiber break will cause a fatal crash. To correct this deficiency, SAFENET has added a second ring in the opposite direction as discussed earlier. This configuration allows for two types of network reconfiguration in the presence of a fault in the cable: ring hop/hold and ring wrap. Ring wrap is caused by a fault in the primary and secondary rings, the faulty sections of both rings are isolated by forming one or more rings out of the remaining portions of the primary and secondary rings [HDBK92].




Figure 7 An overview of component systems comprising SAFENET

Figure 7 depicts the manner in which each component or warfare speciality area is unified into a whole. Each component, alone, is a system; yet, the synergism inherent in SAFENET's configuration and survivability features make it even more formidable.

#### IV. THE SAFENET STANDARD

#### A. THE SAFENET STANDARD AND ITS TESTABILITY

The SAFENET manual provides requirements for the implementation of fiber optic local area networks which are intended for use in support of mission critical computer resources. The SAFENET standard is organizationally well written, but it is large, and complex in its potential interprofile relationships. Each protocol within a SAFENET profile can be viewed as a finite state machine. The task of figuring out which protocol machines are expected to communicate within each profile can be awesome and daunting to some. While concrete design specifications are not expected to be contained in the manual. abstract design specifications should have and would have proven very useful to designers. As a result of neither abstract nor concrete design specifications, the SAFENET manual must be closely scrutinized and intra-profile relationships gleaned to garner all implicit relationships bit by bit in order to attain a formal specification.

The standards manual references in several cases existing standards; however, there are requirements which SAFENET references that are not yet completely formulated and are currently in draft status. SAFENET's Network Development Guidance and Conformance Test Guidance are two such requirements whose standards are listed as drafts. The Development Guidance and the Conformance Test Guidance are very crucial for SAFENET development. Systems Analyst and Designers will use these two manuals extensively to develop their implementation, in conjunction with the SAFENET standards manual. In addition, the Quality Assurance and Testing team will use these two manuals extensively to develop a test package. As a result of these two important publications being in their draft stages of development, the difficulty of testing a SAFENET implementation greatly increases. Consequently, the issue of whether we can implement SAFENET and perform the conformance testing without these two publications, begins to favor having the availability of both publications. Development and testability are greatly enhanced with the

availability of both the SAFENET Network Development Guidance and the SAFENET Conformance Test Guidance.

#### B. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT SAFENET STANDARD

While SAFENET represents a major step forward in communications connectivity, this breakthrough is not without its share of problems and potential pitfalls. Typically, problems are associated with or attributed to any new introductory system. The current manual of SAFENET's standard is neither a users manual nor a technical manual. It is essentially a SAFENET standard document of specification that Development teams can use as guidelines for creating, implementing and testing a SAFENET network. Consequently, the current standard does not contain tutorials or a listing of descriptive features from a users' point of view. The standards manual is inadequate for describing specific features, user protocol interfaces, and for navigating between and within protocols. These features are expected to be contained in an implementor's users manual. Additionally, the current standard while containing much technical information is insufficient in that context, and the manual alone lacks the technical data necessary to facilitate a SAFENET installation in accordance with Military Specifications (MIL-SPECS).

Most of the fiber optic components used commercially meet MIL-SPECS, that is they conform to the quality control standard demanded by MIL-SPECS; however, the fiber optic bypass switch, contained within the TCU, did not perform in accordance with MIL-SPECS [GREE89]. As mentioned earlier, the fiber optic bypass switch bypasses a station which does not energize an electrical signal to this switch. Consequently, the SAFENET committee will have to expend research and development resources in this area to comply with MIL-SPECS. The specification of militarized components makes SAFENET lose the modular "plug" compatibility desired with standard off-the-shelf commercially available components, but this is seen as a necessary trade-off to enhance reliability and survivability.

In theory, ANSI FDDI can support the reliability and survivability features that are proposed for SAFENET, called dual path reconfiguration. SAFENET's approach to enhanced survivability was to initially specify the wrap method and after that specification is completed to actively work on development of a specification which uses both ring hop and wrap methods [GREE89]. The ANSI FDDI standard provides for the dual ring wrap reconfiguration technique; however, the ring hop reconfiguration technique is not supported in ANSI FDDI. The Navy's interest is expected to have a positive impact on development of the ring hop feature. But, whether this hop capability does become in reality a viable reconfiguration technique will depend on whether FDDI chip set manufacturers find the hop method cost effective to implement.

Another major area of concern is the support for time synchronization. The distribution of high precision, synchronized, digital time value among the components of a distributed real time system on a platform wide scale is one of the requirements that exist in all Navy SAFENET tactical systems. During the operational employment of a tactical system or platform, time synchronization is needed continually. The SAFENET Time Service (STS) provides for the distribution of time information and the synchronization of distributed clocks within a system. This capability is necessary for activities such as correlating information provided by various sensors to control weapons, to conduct post event reconstruction of critical events and to accomplish time critical diagnostic tests.

In searching for a candidate protocol for time synchronization, the SAFENET committee found that no true industry-wide standard existed [GREE89]. The Network Time Protocol (NTP), which utilizes a hardware clock of identifiable accuracy bound at each computing element employs a logical synchronized clock as its base. To support the STS each station or node is required to have a local time source, called a Network Clock. The Network Clock includes both the software and hardware components necessary to implement a time source. The STS is partitioned into three functional areas: the clock synchronization service, the user time service, and the time management service. Thus, the STS resident in each node uses the Network Clock to provide the current value of time,

clock quality and accuracy of time value to users in the local SAFENET node and to synchronize with other Network Clocks in the network. It is anticipated that major platforms will have clocks utilizing satellite synchronization; this concept appears to facilitate the Navy's application.

The prototyping activity in progress within the NGCR community is looked upon to supply the critical answer as to whether distributed Network Clocks will satisfy naval requirements. Surprisingly, SAFENET has established no error bounds or performance requirements for the individual Network Clocks in a network. It is assumed that the system implementors will use components of sufficient quality to meet the system specific requirements. The quality of the components used will have a direct impact on the level of synchronization achieved. In all aspects, this represents a potential pitfall; clock synchronization performance is a critical area that will require close attention during system design. The performance requirements of the system will need to be specified and the appropriate configuration parameters determined.

One primary necessity for naval tactical systems is the need to support real time communications, be it, periodic and aperiodic, multicast and point to point, or low latency communications. The ability to delay or even abort low value communications in favor of more urgent communications is a problem for both present and future applications, particularly in the event of momentary insufficient data communication resources [GREE89]. Because of the nature of timed token behavior, ANSI FDDI provides only two levels for data frames, synchronous and asynchronous traffic. This methodology has no effect on which station obtains the right to transmit data next. The basis for SAFENET I, the IEEE 802.5 standard provides a three bit priority field which supports eight levels of priority and is used for selecting the token holder, the next station allowed to transmit frames. The viewpoint of the SAFENET committee is that eight levels of priority is inadequate for meeting system requirements. SAFENET did not provide any real time specification for this area and thus this led to the SAFENET Lightweight Protocol profile. The Lightweight Protocol candidate selected was the XTP protocol which is non-

proprietary, has the potential for industry standardization and provides the needed support for real time communications. The development of SAFENET requirements used the XTP protocol as a reference for what is possible and practical and also as a means of feedback to the XTP developers the requirements which were not met by the current version of the XTP protocol. Thus, the key and potential problem for the Lightweight Protocol profile is how well it supports real time, prioritized traffic in present and future applications.

Presently, in the Lightweight profile only the XTP SAFENET hex address format can be used [HDBK92]. Particularly in stressful moments, hex addressing does not lend itself very well to human recall as the primary means of station addressing. Within the OSI profile, given a logical name known by the application, the Directory Services will provide the needed addressing information. However, no specification exists for real time users not using OSI as the communication protocol, and since SAFENET allows a non-standard approach for the Application, Presentation, and Session layers as well as the Lightweight Protocol underneath, a major problem exists here.

The Lightweight profile's multicast capability envisioned for SAFENET is limited to a single logical LAN segment; this may not be the optimal approach. Naval combat platforms in hostile environments should have the ability to broadcast across multiple LANs to report tactical and strategic casualties (Engineering, Weapons, etc.) to decision makers. The issue of multicast capability to multiple LANs should be reviewed to determine its value to decision makers.

SAFENET addresses the issue of clock granularity, but in terms of clock accuracy, no guidance is established for the performance requirements of the individual network clocks in a network. Determining the system clock resolution is needed to accurately determine the amount of time taken in point to point data transfers. For example, consider a radar target that is passed to weapons for engagement. Clock resolution and synchronization is what is required in this real time scenario for a successful engagement. Without these two, resolution and synchronization, how can a target be engaged, if we do not know whether the data is late, therefore useless or an actual prediction. This issue of clock performance,

resolution and synchronization is a potential pitfall because the determination of what is "sufficient" component quality is left up to the system engineer.

Security as pertains to the protection of data that is transferred on the network is the final area of concern. Although it may not be necessary for all implementations of SAFENET to provide security services, security implementations will be necessary in some platforms. For example, a platform with an implementation that involves data transfers of multiple classification will require a risk analysis to determine which security services to provide. Satisfying the security requirements as provided in MIL-HDBK-818-1 (still in drafting stage) may prove difficult to implement and yet, still conform to SAFENET's standard.

#### v. TESTING FIBER OPTIC LINKS

The design points for a communication link are many and require careful consideration. The band width-length specified for SAFENET Laser or LED with multimode, graded index fiber can support data rates from 10 to several hundred Mbps over distances ranging from 10 meters to 200 kilometers. To design a reliable SAFENET communications data link, a through survey and analysis of system requirements is necessary.

The maximum tolerable bit error rate for the system must be determined. The bit error rate is the probability that an error has been detected in a received bit. The determination of the bit error rate is a critical element in the total SAFENET communications system performance. The bit error rate for a metallic connection is approximately 10<sup>-6</sup>; whereas, a bit error rate of 10<sup>-9</sup> is commonly used for fiber optic data links. The bit error rate is also a product of receiver sensitivity. The total allowable power loss for the link is the difference in the power provided by the source and the power required by the detector. Additionally, some spare power must be present to account for temperature variations, diode aging and bend loss on the fiber. The above criteria represent the major points in fiber optic data link design.

In the case of ANSI FDDI, the single most important factor is the bit error probability  $(P_e)$ . If the  $P_e$  is too high, the need for frame retransmission occurs more frequently; if it is too small, the system will be prohibitively expensive. The  $P_e$  for FDDI is  $2.5 \times 10^{-10}$  which is easily attainable with current optical fiber technology. As long as the signal-to-noise ratio is sufficient, the required  $P_e$  is attainable. Conversely, if the signal-to-noise ratio is insufficient, the  $P_e$  will tend toward certainty (1).

#### A. LOSS BUDGET

A loss budget analysis is important for ensuring that the SAFENET system will meet or exceed performance limits. In conventional radio frequency systems like Ethernet or Token Ring, the signal-to-noise ratio must be large enough to support a specified P<sub>e</sub>. For an optical system, the goal is the same, but the calculations are based on losses specific to the optical net. The ANSI FDDI standard specifies a P<sub>e</sub> of less than 2.5 x 10<sup>-10</sup> [ANNA88]. Robert Kimball provides a detailed explanation of the different losses associated with FDDI [KIMB89]. The reason for conducting this analysis is to determine whether or not the installation will meet the FDDI requirements and thus be in conformance with SAFENET. The general form of the decision statistic is:

$$P \ge \mu_l + \mu_d + \mu_m + 2\sigma_T$$

P represents the available power, defined as 11 dB for FDDI. The first term on the right hand side of the inequality,  $\mu_{l}$ , is the sum of the aggregate component losses in the link. These losses include propagation losses due to irregularities in the fiber, connector losses, splice losses, higher order mode losses (due to refraction inside the fiber), and the Media Interface Connector (MIC) ferrule delta. The MIC ferrule delta accounts for the difference between the precision test ferrule and a production ferrule [KIMB89]. MIC is the plug and receptacle pair that makes the physical connection between the optical fibers and the transmitter or receiver.

The second term on the right hand side,  $\mu_d$ , is the dispersion penalty, which accounts for dispersion losses in the optical fiber. This is a function of bit rate and of several chromatic characteristics of the LEDs used in FDDI. Within the dispersion penalty equation, the average segment length component accounts for links that consist of several spliced segments. This accounts for the bandwidth concatenation phenomena, which may

cause a bandwidth increase in concatenated fibers over what is normally expected in a single, unbroken fiber.

The third term on the right hand side,  $\mu_m$ , is the system margin. It represents a catch-all that allows for variations in the cable plant and a factor that compensates for timing variations between the light level at the output of the fiber and the light received at the lens on the receiver.

The final term on the right hand side,  $2_{\sigma_T}$ , is the total variance of the link loss distribution and is defined as a function of the variances of the dispersion penalty and the loss distribution.

The final step is to substitute all the intermediate results for the right hand side terms back into the original equation to verify that we have not exceeded the loss budget. If the right hand side of the equation exceeds 11 dB, one would need to go back to the SAFENET installation and figure out where the loss budget can be improved. The area that would provide the greatest change with the least effort would be the aggregate component loss factor. Two ways to improve this factor would be to shorten the links between transmitter and receiver or reduce the number of connectors. Obviously, there will be instances where it is impractical to alter this component; consequently, other components on the right hand side of the inequality will have to be evaluated.

#### **B. SYSTEM THROUGHPUT**

Theoretically, networks can approach 100% transmission efficiency, but there are certain trade-offs to be addressed. Contention based protocols which approach 100% transmission efficiency have excessive wait delays associated with them. Collision free protocols such as ANSI FDDI are better suited for approaching the transmission efficiency limit.

#### 1. Clock Accuracy Verification

Timing analysis is critical to determining how well the SAFENET system performs over the network. Recent studies have shown that bottlenecks (choke points) in the protocol stacks and the processors are more detrimental to network speed than the raw data transfer rate. In order to determine how well the SAFENET profiles perform, it is necessary to time different data transfers and compare them. Determining the system clock resolution is needed to accurately determine how long data transfers from one point to another take. Inaccurate timing would propardize the validity of any data collected.

#### 2. Timing Test Procedure

To attain a more meaningful result from data transfer analyses, data transfers should be conducted under normal net loading and under no load "ideal" conditions. Test sets should consist of two groups of file transfers. The test files should be selected based on size. The criteria for size is outlined in the following paragraphs.

The largest data set must be large enough to exceed the size of the buffers on the interface cards. Care must be taken in selecting an appropriate size file and yet minimize the effects (by percentage) of overhead.

The next file has to be smaller than the aforementioned file, but larger than the size of an FDDI packet. The space reserved for data is 4478 bytes in an FDDI packet. Once more, care must be taken to select an appropriate size file while minimizing the effects (by percentage) of overhead. FDDI has no minimum packet size. Percentage of overhead is calculated by dividing the number of bytes of overhead by the number of data bytes, then multiplying the result by 100.

Validating operational specifications set forth by manufacturers and SAFENET's standard and testing for proper installation are dominant reasons for collecting system measurements. Of particular interest are the fiber attenuation, band width, bit error rate, transmitter and receiver coupled power, connector loss, splice loss and the signal-to-noise ratio. Some measurements for conformance determination are to be taken before, during

and after installation. Fortunately, test equipment in conjunction with the theoretical and empirical analyses are available to measure and test each area of concern. The Consultative Committee International Telegraph and Telephone (CCITT) has produced recommendations for test methods to which, it is hoped, most SAFENET component manufacturers and test equipment manufacturers will adhere. The testing procedure is, test all parts and components before installation, test all parts and components after installation, and perform integration tests by testing subsystems and entire systems after installation. For complete systems tests, ensure data test sets emulate valid data; this will ensure that the results obtained are meaningful.

## VI. TESTING SAFENET'S IMPLEMENTATION PROFILES

#### A. TEST METHOD

In this section, the test procedure is described; the following description is actually a refinement of the method described in [MILL90]. From the SAFENET standard, Finite State Machine Diagrams of the protocols contained within the SAFENET profiles were created. From these diagrams, predicate-action tables for systems of communicating machines were created for the OSI and Light Weight implementations. The test procedure's initial input is a protocol specified as a system of communicating machines and the output is a complete test sequence and an Input/Output diagram. In order to proceed from the specification of a protocol machine or profile implementation to a test sequence, identification of the shared and local variables is necessary. The shared and local variables present a way for the tester to provide input to and observe output from the machine during testing. The test of each edge, transition, is treated as a separate, individual test, and may modify some or all of the shared and local variables.

The format of each single edge, transition sequence is

$$S_{I} i_{1}, i_{2},...i_{n}/o_{1},o_{2},...o_{m} S_{F}$$

where  $S_I$  is the state of the machine at the start of the test,  $i_1, i_2, ... i_n$  are the values of the input variables before the test,  $o_1, o_2, ... o_m$  are the values of the output variables after the test, and  $S_E$  is the state of the machine at the end of the test. The input and output variables are determined before testing begins and are taken from the shared and local variables of the machine or profile. The procedure consists of preliminary steps, the test sequence generating procedure, and refining steps.

## 1. Preliminary Steps

- 1. From the machine specification finite state diagram, mark each transition whose name appears on more than one transition or edge. Each such instance for a given name is given a separate distinguishing label.
- 2. From the predicate-action table note the number of distinct conditions or clauses in each enabling predicate. Mark each clause.
- 3. For each shared variable x, determine if x is an input variable, output variable or both an input and output variable. For each x which is both input and output, split x into two variables,  $x_I$  and  $x_O$  for testing purposes.
- 4. For each local variable l, determine if l is used as an interface to the higher layer user of this profile or protocol. If such is the case, mark l as input, output or both. Each such local variable is an input variable if it appears in an enabling predicate and a output variable if it appears in an action on the left side of an assignment arrow. If l is both input and output, it is split into variables l<sub>I</sub> and l<sub>O</sub> for testing purposes.

Step 1 is to ensure that each instance of each transition is tested. A protocol specification may have the same transition name on more than one arc; this step provides a degree of certainty that every arc is tested. Step 2 ensures that each clause is tested individually, if possible. An enabling predicate may consist of several clauses, any one of which may be true, allowing the transition to execute. In steps 3 and 4, the shared and local variables are identified. Shared variables provide the means of communication between the machine and other protocol entities within a profile. Local variables allow communication with the user of the protocol or profile. In essence, these variables are the means the test designer has of giving inputs to the machine and observing its actions.

In some system of communicating machine specifications, additional variables are defined that are used internally by the protocol or profile machine and are not visible to the user (upper layer(s) of the protocol) or the tester. Typically, such variables are counters or

array indices. These variables should not appear in the test sequence as they are not under the direct control or observation of the tester.

# 2. Test Sequence Generating Procedure

- 1.  $S_1 \leftarrow initial\_state$
- 2. Let t = (p,a) be an untested transition from an arbitrary state. What this notation means is that the current transition being tested, t, has the predicate, p, as input and the action, a, as output.
- (a) Determine the values of the input variables which make exactly one of the untested values of p true. Check to see if these values allow any other transition from this state to be executed. If so, set additional input variables to values that ensure that only the transition being tested is enabled. Fill in the necessary input variables, and mark the others DC for "don't care."
- (b) Determine and mark the expected values for the output variables. In addition record the expected values assumed by the local variables.
  - (c) Determine the expected next state and set S<sub>E</sub> to it.
- (d) Determine if S<sub>E</sub> is transient; if it is not, label it as a "stop state" and proceed to step 3. Within the confines of the test procedure, a state is transient if one or more of its enabling predicates is true upon reaching the state. This means that the machine can proceed to another state without having to wait for further input from the tester.
- (e) Attempt to make  $S_E$  into a stop state by setting DC values such that when state  $S_E$  is reached, none of its enabling predicates are true. If successful, proceed to step 3.
- (f)  $S_E$  is a transient state. If more than one transition leaving  $S_E$  is enabled, arbitrarily select one and set the input not yet specified, such that only one transition leaving  $S_E$  is enabled. Set t = (p,a) to this transition.
  - 3. Output this test  $S_I i_1, i_2, ... i_n/o_1, o_2, ... o_m S_E$  as the next test in the sequence.

- 4. Mark the clause just tested. If all clauses in transition t are now tested, mark t as tested. If all transitions are now marked as tested, exit to "refining steps." Otherwise, proceed to step 5.
- 5. Set  $S_I$  to  $S_E$ . If  $S_I$  is a stop state, proceed to step 2,; otherwise, proceed to step 2(b).

Step 2(a) attempts to test each clause separately. For well designed protocols this is generally true. It is vital in that the tester knows which transition was enabled, and as a result, caused the transition to occur. In the event that it is not possible to individually test each clause, the test designer must set the input variables such that the clauses are tested as meticulously as possible. It is quite possible that such clauses may be tested in conjunction with one another. However, if a clause cannot be tested individually, the question of clause necessity to the specification arises.

Steps 2(d), 2(e) and 2(f) are concerned with transient states. If execution of a state immediately enables another transition, it may prove difficult or even impossible for the tester to verify that the values contained in the output variables are as expected. For such a circumstance, the transient state and possible multiple enabling transitions that can not be controlled with these test methods, could indicate the need to modify the specification for better testability.

Step 5 initializes the start state of the next test in the sequence to the ending state of the current test. The advantage here is that the ordering of the tests follow the order of their occurrence in the actual profile implementation. In order to exercise all parts of a protocol or profile implementation, some transitions may have to be executed more than once. In such a circumstance, judgement by the test designer may be needed. This is not necessarily a cause for concern; in the normal operation of a profile or protocol machine, certain transitions may be executed more than others. Consequently, during testing the same trend will likely be true.

# 3. Refining Steps

- 1. Construct the Input/Output state diagram from the test sequence. In this step, the stop state information is also used, assuming that there is at least one stop state.
- 2. For each state, determine a shortest Unique Input/Output (UIO) sequence (if one exists). Append the UIO sequence for  $S_E$  to the end of the test sequence. If no UIO sequence for the current  $S_E$  exists, continue testing transactions (extending the sequence) until an  $S_E$  with a UIO is visited.
- 3. Check for converging transactions which are difficult to test and may require special handling. These transactions are marked as potential problems.

In step 1, the Input/Output diagram is constructed from the test sequence and is a tool to help the test designer ensure completeness. This diagram is constructed directly from the test sequence with the knowledge of "stop states." The diagram's initial state will be initial state S<sub>I</sub>; additional states are added for each stop state is encountered. The arcs are directed, and labeled with the with the values of the input and output variables.

The I/O diagram generated from the test sequence can be viewed as an incomplete finite state machine specification. However, there is a relationship to the specification machine, because there is a tour through the specified transactions. It is not identical to the specification; there are states which are transitory in the specification and does not appear in the IO diagram.

The purpose of the final UIO sequence in step 2 serves to verify that the last state which was reached in the test sequence is indeed the current state of the protocol or profile machine. Because the details of the machine's implementation are assumed to be "hidden" from the tester, the existence of at least state with a UIO sequence is necessary. Without the UIO sequence, there is no way of knowing if the last transition tested, left the machine in the expected state.

In actuality, the converging transitions, identified in step 3, are distinct transactions, with identical labels, which originate from different states but terminate at the same state.

The existence of converging conditions can not be eliminated always and, therefore, complicates the role of the test designer and makes error detection difficult. These circumstances may naturally occur in the specification of a protocol, but should be marked for special observation.

#### B. APPLICATION OF TEST METHOD

In this section the test generating procedure is illustrated using derived specifications for two of the SAFENET standard profiles: OSI profile and Lightweight profile. The profiles are first specified as a system of communicating machines and then the procedure is given.

### 1. OSI Profile Specification

The specification of the OSI profile consists of the predicate-action table (Table 1), the specification for each protocol within the profile, given in Figure 8, and the interprocess shared variable MEDIUM, shown in Figure 9. The single intra-process shared variable Transfer is used to model the network node's internal bus, which is shared by the protocols within a node or station. An internal transmission is modeled by a write into this shared variable. The first field "Transfer.T" takes the value T or F, which is used to indicate whether the frame represents a time synchronization frame or a data frame. The second field, DA for Destination Address, contains the address of the protocol machine to which the message is transmitted. The next field, SA for Source Address contains the originator's address. Fields four through eleven contain the values T or F and are used to control the intra-process routing; based on the values contained in these variables, the frame's Destination Address is determined. Finally, the data field contains the data block itself. The single shared variable MEDIUM is used to model the bus, which is shared by each machine or network node. A transmission onto the bus is modeled by a write into this shared variable. The first field "MEDIUM.T" takes the value T or F, which is used to indicate whether the frame represents a time synchronization frame or a data frame. The second field, DA for Destination Address, contains the address of the network station to which the message is transmitted. The next field, SA for Source Address contains the originator's address; finally, the data field contains the data block itself.

The OSI profile is defined by a finite state machine, a set of local variables and a predicate-action table. The initial state of each profile machine is state 0, and the shared variables MEDIUM and Transfer are initially set to contain the respective address of one of the stations or protocol machines in the DA field.

The local variables inbuf, outbuf, etc. are used for storing data blocks to be transmitted to or received from other protocols. Outbuf is an array, and can store a potentially large number of data blocks.


The initial state of each profile machine is state 0 and all local variables are initially set to empty. The inter-process shared variable MEDIUM initially contains the address of one station in its DA field. Therefore, the initial system state tuple is (0,...,0) and the first transition taken by a station holding the token will be xmit\_time, or xmit\_msg.

Each profile machine has 18 states. In the initial state, 0, the station is quiescent, merely waiting for an incoming message, a transmit message signal, or a transmit time synchronization signal. If a frame appears in the variable MEDIUM with the network node's own address, the transition to state 1 is taken. When taking the xmit\_time transition, in state 2, the station transmits the data blocks that it has via Transfer, moving to state 3. In state 3, the station transmits the data blocks it has, moving to state 6. As specified by the SAFENET standard, synchronization frames are sent via the ISO CLNP Protocol [HDBK92] page. 37. In state 6, the data blocks are formed into datagrams and transmitted, moving to state 17. In state 17, the station transmits any data blocks it has moving to state 18. In state 18, the station transmits until its token holding time expires or all of its messages are sent; the station then returns to state 0. When taking the xmit\_clear\_logical\_msg transition, in state 8, the station transmits the blocks that it has, moving to either state 9, state 10 or state 11. If in state 9, the station transmits the data blocks it has moving to state 14. If in state 10, the station transmits the data blocks it has

moving to state 14. If in state 11, the station transmits the data blocks it has moving to state 12. From state 12, the station transmits the data blocks it has moving to state 13. If in state 13, the station transmits the data blocks it has moving to state 14. If in state 14, the station transmits the data blocks it has moving to state 15. From state 15, the station moves to station 16 after transmitting its data blocks. When in state 16, the station transmits the data blocks it has moving to states 4, 5, or 6; this transition is based on the message size and its destination address' location. If in state 4, the station transmits the data blocks it has moving to state 17; from states 5, or 6, the station transmits its data blocks, moving to state 17. In state 17, the station transmits any data blocks it has moving to state 18. In state 18, the station transmits until its token holding time expires or all it messages are sent; the station then returns to state 0.

The receiving profile station, like all other stations not in possession of the token, will be in state 0. The message will appear in MEDIUM, with the receiving station's address in the DA field. The receive transition to state 1 will be taken. In state 1 the data block is copied and the MEDIUM is cleared by the ready transition. By clearing the MEDIUM, the receiving station enables the sending station to return to its initial state (0) or its sending state (18).

For this simplified high-level specification, the channels inter-process and intraprocess are assumed to be error free. This means that the clearing of the medium by the receiver can be taken as an acknowledgment by the sender. Hence, there is no requirement for timers, time-outs or error checking on the channel. Although some of the finer details of the OSI profile are omitted, this specification contains the main idea of the OSI profile, and provides sufficient detail for the generation of a test sequence.



Each machine within the OSI profile in Figure 8 performs the following:

- State 0 In the initial state, the machine is quiescent, merely waiting to process a request or transmission.
- State 1 In the receive state, the machine copies an incoming message from the bus and acknowledges receipt of the message by clearing the bus.
- State 2 The SAFENET Time Service protocol provides for the distribution of time information and the synchronization of distributed clocks within a system.
- State 3 In addition to Lightweight and Xpress Transfer Protocol support, the OSI Connectionless transport protocol directly supports STS's protocol data unit transfer. It provides the user with the ability to transmit a single unit of data, datagram, without the requirement of a connection being established.
- State 4 The ISO End System-to-Intermediate System routing exchange protocol passes address information among all stations that are on the same LAN segment or through intermediate stations. The ES/IS protocol provides stations with the ability to associate a data link layer address with a given network layer address.
- State 5 The ISO Intermediate System-to-Intermediate System intra-domain routing protocol provides SAFENET networks with dynamic determination of routes used to pass data between intermediate systems.
- State 6 The ISO Connectionless Network protocol provides services for network routing and for the segmentation and reassembly of transport layer messages that are too large for the underlying communications service. Additionally, the ISO CLNP has multicast data transfer capability, but limits the scope of transfers to users on a single LAN segment.
- State 7 The Private Communications protocol provides a means for secure communications between network stations.
- State 8 The Directory Services provides a mapping from "user friendly" names (application entity titles) to presentation service access point addresses required in communication instances.
- State 9 The File Transfer, Access, and Management protocol provides services for transferring information in the form of files among application processes and file stores.
- State 10 The Association Control Service Element protocol provides services for the establishment and termination of application layer associations and a standard service for application layer protocols to communicate common parameters.
- State 11 The System Management Application Service Element protocols specifies the management functions which are supported in a system node, and defines the semantics and abstract syntaxes of information transferred. It uses CMISE for communication.
- State 12 The Common Management Information Service Element protocol provides a common message framework for management procedures supplying both datamanipulation and notification/operation-oriented services.
- State 13 The Remote Operations Service Element protocol is used in support of CMISE, and provides a simple, uniform service for remotely invoking operations and

- then receiving correlated replies to those operations.
- State 14 The ISO Presentation protocol is concerned with the syntax of data the data
  exchanged between application entities and resolves differences in format and
  data representation. The presentation layer defines the syntax used between
  application entities and provides for the selection and subsequent modification
  of the representation to be used.
- State 15 The ISO Session protocol provides the mechanism for controlling the dialogue between applications. At a minimum, it provides a means for two application processes to establish and use a connection.
- State 16 The ISO Connection-Oriented Transport protocol provides for the establishment, maintenance, and termination of a logical connection between transport users. It allows connection-related features such as flow control, error control, and sequenced delivery.
- State 17 The Logical Link Control protocol provides three services: Unacknowledged connectionless service which supports point-to-point, multipoint and broadcast in a datagram style of service, Connection-oriented services which provides flow control, sequencing, and error recovery, Acknowledged connectionless service which provides for acknowledgment of individual frames and supports point-to-point transfers.
- State 18 The FDDI Token LAN protocol provides the ability to get data on and off the physical medium in a controlled manner.

t = time; m = map; p = private; DA = destination address; SA = source address

Inter-process variable

	_			Ln	ter-p	roce	ss variab	le		
MEDIUM T	DA	SA	P	Da	ıta					
				In	tra-p	roce	ss variab	le		
Transfer T DA SA	P	M	ES	ß		L F	TAM AC	CSE SMA	AS Data	
		4464101111	.411461444		115014044	1641441141	1814521481166886666	SH	ARED	********
	_				141611361	1411146114	1911/1914/1614	<u> </u>	local variables	***********
inbuf	T	DA	SA	P	D	ata				
outbuf 1	Т	DA	SA	P	D	ata				
outbuf n	T	DA	SA	P	D	ata				
sts_msg	T	DA	SA	D	ata					$\Box$
cl_trans_msg	Т	DA	SA	ES	IS	CL	Data			
co_trans_msg	T	DA	SA	ES	IS	CL	Data			
xmit_clear_msg	DA	SA	P	M	FT	AM	ACSE	SMAS	Data	
private_msg	DA	SA	P	M	FT	AM	ACSE	SMAS	Data	
xmit_clear_logical_msg	DA	SA	P	M	FT	AM	ACSE	SMAS	Data	]
xmit_private_logical_msg	DA	SA	P	M	FT.	<b>AM</b>	ACSE	SMAS	Data	
xmit_private_msg	DA	SA	P	M	FT	AM	ACSE	SMAS	Data	
xmit_clear_map_msg	DA	SA	P	М	FT	AM	ACSE	SMAS	Data	
xmit_private_map_msg	DA	SA	P	M	FT	AM	ACSE	SMAS	Data	
ftam_msg,										

rose\_msg,
presentation\_msg,
session\_msg,
es/is\_msg,
is/is\_msg,
clnp\_msg,
llc\_msg
T DA SA P Data

acse\_msg, smase\_msg, cmise\_msg,

Figure 9 OSI Network Node Data Structure

**Table 1: OSI PREDICATE-ACTIONS** 

nanatoguamenapapananamanana Transition	mummanamumummanamummanamum   Predicate	пининининининининининининининининининин
receive	MEDIUM.DA = i	inbuf ← MEDIUM
ready	true	MEDIUM ← Ø
xmit_time	outbuf (n) $\neq \emptyset \land \text{outbuf}(n).t = \text{true}$	Transfer $\leftarrow$ outbuf (n) $\land$ outbuf (n) $\leftarrow \emptyset$
sts_msg	sts_msg (t, data) = (true, msg)	Transfer $\leftarrow$ sts_msg $\wedge$ sts_msg $\leftarrow \emptyset$
private_msg (p_msg)	$p_msg(p, m, data) = (true, DC, msg)$	$Transfer \leftarrow p\_msg \land p\_msg \leftarrow \varnothing$
xmit_clear_logical_msg	xclm (p, m, data) = (false, true, msg)	Transfer $\leftarrow x clm \land x clm \leftarrow \emptyset$
xmit_private_logical_msg	xplm (p, m, data) = (true, true, msg)	Transfer $\leftarrow$ xplm $\wedge$ xplm $\leftarrow \emptyset$
xmit_clear_msg (xcm)	xcm (p, m, smase) = (false, false, true)	Transfer $\leftarrow$ xcm $\wedge$ xcm $\leftarrow \emptyset$
xmit_clear_msg (xcm)	xcm (p, m, acse) = (false, false, true)	Transfer $\leftarrow$ xcm $\wedge$ xcm $\leftarrow$ $\emptyset$
xmit_clear_msg (xcm)	xcm (p, m, ftam) = (false, false, true)	Transfer $\leftarrow$ xcm $\wedge$ xcm $\leftarrow$ $\emptyset$
xmit_clear_map_msg	xcmm (p, m, ftam) = (false, true, true)	Transfer $\leftarrow$ xcmm $\wedge$ xcmm $\leftarrow \emptyset$
xmit_clear_map_msg	xcmm(p, m, smase) = (false, true, true	Transfer $\leftarrow$ xcmm $\wedge$ xcmm $\leftarrow \emptyset$
xmit_clear_map_msg	xcmm (p, m, acse) = (false, true, true)	Transfer $\leftarrow$ xcmm $\wedge$ xcmm $\leftarrow \emptyset$
xmit_private_map_msg	xpmm (p, m, smase) = (true, true, true)	Transfer $\leftarrow$ xpmm $\wedge$ xpmm $\leftarrow \emptyset$
xmit_private_map_msg	xpmm (p, m, ftam) = (true, true, true)	Transfer $\leftarrow$ xpmm $\wedge$ xpmm $\leftarrow \emptyset$
xmit_private_map_msg	xpmm (p, m, acse) = (true, true, true)	Transfer $\leftarrow$ xpmm $\wedge$ xpmm $\leftarrow \emptyset$
xmit_private_msg (xpm)	xpm (p, m, ftam) = (true, false, true)	Transfer $\leftarrow$ xpm $\wedge$ xpm $\leftarrow \emptyset$
xmit_private_msg (xpm)	xpm (p, m, acse) = (true, false, true)	Transfer $\leftarrow$ xpm $\wedge$ xpm $\leftarrow$ $\emptyset$
xmit_private_msg (xpm)	xpm (p, m, smase) = (true, false, true)	Transfer $\leftarrow$ xpm $\wedge$ xpm $\leftarrow \emptyset$
ftam_msg	ftam_msg ≠Ø	Transfer $\leftarrow$ ftam_msg $\land$ ftam_msg $\leftarrow \emptyset$
acse_msg	acse_msg ≠ Ø	Transfer $\leftarrow$ acse_msg $\wedge$ acse_msg $\leftarrow \emptyset$
smase_msg	smase_msg ≠ Ø	Transfer $\leftarrow$ smase_msg $\wedge$ smase_msg $\leftarrow \emptyset$
cmise_msg	cmise_msg ≠ Ø	Transfer $\leftarrow$ cmise_msg $\land$ cmise_msg $\leftarrow \varnothing$
rose_msg	rose_msg ≠ Ø	Transfer $\leftarrow$ rose_msg $\wedge$ rose_msg $\leftarrow \emptyset$
presentation_msg (pm)	pm≠Ø	Transfer $\leftarrow$ pm $\land$ pm $\leftarrow$ $\varnothing$
session_msg (sm)	sm ≠ Ø	Transfer $\leftarrow$ sm $\wedge$ sm $\leftarrow \emptyset$
co_trans_msg (cotm)	cotm ≠ Ø ∧ cotm.es = true	Transfer $\leftarrow$ cotm $\wedge$ cotm $\leftarrow \emptyset$
co_trans_msg (cotm)	cotm ≠ Ø ∧ cotm.is = true	Transfer $\leftarrow$ cotm $\wedge$ cotm $\leftarrow \emptyset$
co_trans_msg (cotm)	$cotm \neq \emptyset \land cotm.cl = true$	Transfer $\leftarrow$ cotm $\wedge$ cotm $\leftarrow \emptyset$
cl_trans_msg (cltm)	cltm ≠ Ø	Transfer $\leftarrow$ cltm $\wedge$ cltm $\leftarrow \emptyset$
es/is_msg	es/is_msg ≠ Ø	Transfer $\leftarrow$ es/is_msg $\land$ es/is_msg $\leftarrow \emptyset$
is/is_msg	is/is_msg ≠ Ø	Transfer $\leftarrow$ is/is_msg $\land$ is/is_msg $\leftarrow \emptyset$
clnp_msg	clnp_msg ≠ Ø	Transfer $\leftarrow$ clnp_msg $\wedge$ clnp_msg $\leftarrow \emptyset$
llc_msg	lic_msg ≠ Ø	Transfer $\leftarrow$ llc_msg $\wedge$ llc_msg $\leftarrow \emptyset$
msg_sent	true	MEDIUM ← Ø

### 1. OSI Test Sequence Generation

First the preliminary steps are carried out; these steps determine the exact format of the tests. The measures employed are primarily concerned with input and output variables. After the preliminary steps, the tests are generated. For ease of reference the numbering below corresponds to the steps in the test procedure.

## a. Preliminary Steps

- (1) From Figure 8's Lightweight profile specification finite state diagram, we see that all transition labels are unique; therefore, no action is required.
- (2) All transitions have single clause enabling predicates; therefore, no action is required.
- (3) The shared variable MEDIUM is both an input and an output variable; therefore it is split into two variables MEDIUM<sub>I</sub> and MEDIUM<sub>O</sub> for testing purposes. The intra-process shared variable Transfer is both an input and an output variable; therefore it is split into two variables Transfer<sub>I</sub> and Transfer<sub>O</sub> for testing purposes
- (4) The local variables outbuf, sts\_msg, private\_msg, xmit\_private\_logical\_msg, xmit\_clear\_logical\_msg, xmit\_clear\_msg, xmit\_clear\_msg, xmit\_private\_map\_msg, xmit\_private\_msg, ftam\_msg, acse\_msg, smase\_msg, cmise\_msg, rose\_msg, presentation\_msg, session\_msg, co\_trans\_msg, cl\_trans\_msg, llc\_msg, clnp\_msg, es/is\_msg and is/is\_msg are both input and output variables; therefore they are split into two respective variables, for example private\_msg\_I and private\_msg\_, for testing purposes.

Note that in step 2, the co\_trans\_msg and xmit\_time are not separated into two different clauses because both conditions must be true for the transition to be enabled.

From these preliminary steps, we can see that the test will adhere to the following form:

 $S_{I}\,MEDIUM_{I}\,Transfer_{I}\,outbuf_{I}...\,llc\_msg_{I}\,/\,MEDIUM_{O}\,Transfer_{O}\,outbuf_{O}...$   $llc\_msg_{O}\,inbuf\,S_{E}$ 

Now we are ready to begin generating the test sequence.

### b. Test Sequence Generation

- (1) We begin in the initial state, 0. In step 2 we may choose any untested transition emanating from state 0; we select the xmit\_clear\_msg transition.(step 9).
- 2(a) According to the predicate-action table, to enable this transition the local variable xmit\_clear\_msg must contain data for processing and the DA field of xmit\_msg is assumed to be state 9's address. The remaining fields may have any values, and are indicated by an "x" in Table 2. The other input variables are set to DC for "don't care."
- 2(b) When the transition occurs, Transfer copies the data from xmit\_clear\_msg, and xmit\_clear\_msg is set to empty.
  - 2(c) S<sub>E</sub> is set to the expected end state for this test, which is state 9.
- (3) Noting that the next state is a stop state, this completes the first test in the sequence, and the appropriate values are shown in Table 2.
  - (4) This clause and transition are now marked "tested."
- (5) The value of  $S_I$  is now set to 9 and another iteration starting at step 10 is called for.

The next iteration of the procedure selects the ftam\_msg transition, and the values selected are shown as the tenth test entered in Table 2. The expected ending state for this tenth test is 14. The next iteration of the procedure selects the presentation\_msg transition, and the values selected are shown as the eleventh test entered in Table 2. The expected ending state for this tenth test is 15. From state 15 in test step 12, we take the session\_msg transition. The expected ending state resulting from this transition is 16.

At the next iteration, the co\_trans\_msg transition is taken; the expected ending state for this thirteenth test is 4. From state 4, we take the es/is\_msg transition. In test step fourteen, the expected ending state resulting from this transition is 17. From state 17, we take the llc\_msg transition; the expected ending state for this fifteenth test is 18. From state

18, we exercise the msg\_sent transition using the "true" predicate, which leads back to the initial state.

The remaining untested transitions are executed in a similar manner resulting in a final test sequence of 356 steps. The values of the input and output variables for all of these tests are shown in the appendix.

Table 2: TEST SEQUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE

:	,			outbuf	sts	private		xmit clear logicāl	xmit clear	xmit clear	xmit private	xmit_pr ivate_
Iransition	51	MEDIUMI	=	7	-	msgi	_		msgı	19cm - dom	38	msg <sub>l</sub>
j receive	0	X,1,X,X	DC									
2 ready	1	20	20	DC DC		L						
3 xmit_time	0	<b>2</b> 0	DC	1								
4 sts_msg	2	DC	<b>ጋ</b> [	DC DC	T,DA,x,x							
S cl_trans_msg	3	DC	20	1								
6 clnp_msg	9	20	<b>2</b> 0	2G 2G	í							
7 Ilc_msg	17	DC	2	1								
8 msg_sent	18	DC	20									
9 xmit_clear_msg	0	$\Sigma$ C	20	DC DC				ď	A.x.F.F.T.	i,F,x		
10 ftam_msg	6	DC	20	DC DC	ì							
11 presentation_msg	14	DC	20	DC DC	í							
12 session_msg	15	DC	20	DC DC								
13 co_trans_msg	16	DC	OC	DC DC								
14 es/ıs_msg	4	20	DC	DC DC								
15 llc_msg	17	DC	20	DC DC								
16msg_sent	18	DC	DC									
17 xmit_clear_msg	0	DC	DC .	l				J	AIFET	EFA		
18 ftam_msg	6	DC	20	DC DC								
19presentation_msg	14	DC	20									
20 session_msg	15	DC	DC	DC DC								
21 co_trans_msg	16	DC	DC	DC DC	<b>.</b>							
22 is/is_msg	5	DC	20	DC DC								
23 llc_msg	17	DC	DC									
24 msg_sent	18	DC	DC	DC DC								
25 xmit_clear_msg	0	DC	20	DC DC				I	A.x.F.F.T.	;F,n		
26 ftam_msg	6	DC	<b>DC</b>	DC DC	1							
27presentation_msg	14	DC	DC	DC DC								
28 session_msg	15	DC	20	DC DC								
29 co_trans_msg	16	DC	DC	DC DC								
30 is/is_msg	٥	DC	DC	i								
31 llc_msg	17	DC	2	. [								
32 msg_sent	18	DC	DC DC	DC DC								
												ı

Table 2: TEST SEQUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE (CONTINUED)

fram_ msg <sub>1</sub>	acse msg <sub>1</sub>	smase_ msg <sub>i</sub>	cmise_ msg <sub>I</sub>	rose	presentation tation msg.	session msg <sub>l</sub>	co trans msg <sub>1</sub>	ci_trans_ msg <sub>1</sub>	es/is msg_	is/is msgī	clnp_ msg <sub>1</sub>	lic msg <sub>l</sub>
_												
2												
3												
4												
5								T,DA,x,F,F,T				
9											T,DA,x,x,x	
7												T,DA,x,x,x
8												
6												
10 1,DA,1,1,1												
11					x,DA,x,x,x							
12						x,X,x,x,x						
13							x,DA,x,T,F,F,x					
14									x,DA,x,x,x			
15												х,ДА,х,х
16												
17												
18 1,DA,1,1,1												
19					1,DA,x,x,x							
20						x,DA,x,x,x						
21							x,DA,x,F,T,F,x					
22										x,DA,x,x,x		
23												х,ДА,х,х,х
24												
25												
26 x.DA.x.x,x												
27					x,DA,x,x,x							
28						x,DA,x,x,x						
29							x,DA,x,F,F,T,x					
30											х,ЛА,х,х,х	
31												x,DA,x,x,x
32												

able 2: TEST SEQUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE (CONTINUED)

			outbufo	sts	private_ mse_	xmit_priv	xmit clear logical	xmit clear_	xmit clear	to sts_ private ate logical logical clear xmit clear xmit clear xmit private ivate	xmit_pr ivate_	fram
DC         DC         DC	MEDIUMO	Siero	(7,1)	msgo		l_msgo	msg <sub>O</sub>	msgo		map_msg <sub>O</sub>	msgo	096111
December   December	1 DC	DC										
DE         DE<		DC										
DE         DE<		T,x,SA,x,x	Н									
DC         TASALET         DC         DC           DC         TASALA         DC         DC           DC         LASALA         DC         DC           DC         ALASALA         DC </td <td></td> <td>T,x,SA,x</td> <td></td> <td>0</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>		T,x,SA,x		0								
DC         TASAAAA         DC         DC           DC         1A.SAAAA         DC         DC         DC           DC         1A.SAAAA         DC         DC         DC         DC           DC         1A.SAAAA         DC         DC         DC         DC         DC           DC         1A.SAAAA         DC         DC         DC         DC         DC         DC           DC         1A.SAAAA         DC		T.x.SA.F.F.T										
DC         TASALA         DC         DC <th< td=""><td></td><td>T,x,SA,x,x</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></th<>		T,x,SA,x,x										
Ø         DC         DC         DC           DC         1.43A.14		T,x,SA,x,	1									
DC         LAAFETFFA         DC         DC           DC         ALSAAA         DC         DC           DC         ALSAAAA         DC         DC           DC         ALSAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA		ΣC	ı									
DC         143A44         DC         DC <th< td=""><td></td><td>x,SA,F,F,T,F,F,x</td><td>1 1</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>Ø</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></th<>		x,SA,F,F,T,F,F,x	1 1					Ø				
DC         4.45A.44         DC         DC           DC         4.45A.44         DC         DC         DC           DC         4.35A.44         <		r,r,SA,r,r										Ø
DC         AASAAA         DC         DC           DC         AASAAA         DC	11 DC	x.x,SA.x,x										
DC         AASAAA         DC         DC           DC         AASAAA         DC         DC           DC         AASAAAA         DC         DC           DC         AASAAAAA         DC         DC           DC         AASAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA		х,х,ЅА,х,х										
DC         aaSAaa         DC         DC <th< td=""><td></td><td>x,x,SA,T,F,F,x</td><td>!</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></th<>		x,x,SA,T,F,F,x	!									
DC         ALSAALA         DC         DC <t< td=""><td></td><td>x,x,SA,x,x</td><td>ı</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></t<>		x,x,SA,x,x	ı									
Ø         DC         DC </td <td></td> <td>х,х,ЅА,х,х</td> <td></td>		х,х,ЅА,х,х										
DC         A.SAFETJEA         DC		DC	i									
DC         xa.Sa.aa         DC         <		x,SA,F.F.T.F.F.x						Ø				
DC         AASAAA         DC         DC <th< td=""><td>l</td><td>х,х,SА,х,х</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>0</td></th<>	l	х,х,SА,х,х										0
DC         AASAAA         DC         DC <th< td=""><td></td><td>x,x,SA,x,x</td><td>l I</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></th<>		x,x,SA,x,x	l I									
DC         AASAFTEA         DC         <		x,x,SA,x,x										
DC         AASAAA         DC         DC <th< td=""><td></td><td>a,x,SA,F,TF,a</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></th<>		a,x,SA,F,TF,a										
DC         DC<		а, х, S. А, я, х										
Ø         DC         DC </td <td></td> <td>x,x,SA,x,x</td> <td>l l</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>		x,x,SA,x,x	l l									
DC         A.SA.FITER         DC		DC	. 1									
DC         xx.SAxx         DC         DC <t< td=""><td></td><td>x,SA.F.F.F.F.x</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>Ø</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></t<>		x,SA.F.F.F.F.x						Ø				
DC         AASAAA         DC           DC         DC         DC		1,1,SA,1,1										Ø
DC         AASAAA         DC           IX         AASAEETA         DC           IX         AASAAA         IX           DC         AASAAA         IX           Ø         IX         IX		x,x,SA,x,x										
IX*         xxSAEFTx         IX*           IX*         xxSAxx         IX*           DC         xxSAxx         IX*           Ø         IX*         IX*		х,х,ЅА,х,х										
		x,x,SA,F.F.T,x										
DC         A.A.SA.R.A         DC           Ø         DC         DC		х,х,ЅА,х,х	li									
Ø 1x, 1x.		а,а,S.А.я,я										!
		IX										

SE 15 91 91 91 inbuf x,x,SA,x,x Table 2: TEST SEQUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE (CONTINUED) ik msgo Ø Ø Ø 0 clnp\_ msgo Ø Ø is/is msg<sub>O</sub> Ø es/is msgo Ø cl\_trans\_ msgo Ø presen session co trans-tation msgo msgo Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø 0 Ø rose\_ msgo cmise\_ smase\_ msgo\_ msgo acse

## 2. Lightweight Profile Specification

The specification of the Lightweight profile consists of the predicate-action table (Table 2), the specification for each protocol within the profile, given in Figure 10, and the inter-process shared variable MEDIUM, shown in Figure 11. The single intra-process shared variable Transfer is used to model the network node's internal bus, which is shared by the protocols within a node or station. An internal transmission is modeled by a write into this shared variable. The first field Transfer. T takes the value T or F, which is used to indicate whether the frame represents a time synchronization frame or a data frame. The second field, DA for Destination Address, contains the address of the protocol machine to which the message is transmitted. The next field, SA for Source Address contains the originator's address. Fields four through eleven contain the values T or F and are used to control the intra-process routing; based on the values contained in these variables, the frame's Destination Address is determined. Finally, the data field contains the data block itself. The single shared variable MEDIUM is used to model the bus, which is shared by each machine or network node. A transmission onto the bus is modeled by a write into this shared variable. The first field MEDIUM. T takes the value T or F, which is used to indicate whether the frame represents a time synchronization frame or a data frame. The second field, DA for Destination Address, contains the address of the network station to which the message is transmitted. The next field, SA for Source Address contains the originator's address; finally, the data field contains the data block itself.

The Lightweight profile is defined by a finite state machine, a set of local variables and a predicate-action table. The initial state of each profile machine is state 0, and the shared variables MEDIUM and Transfer are initially set to contain the respective address of one of the stations or protocol machines in the DA field.

The local variables inbuf, outbuf, etc. are used for storing data blocks to be transmitted to or received from other protocols. Outbuf is an array, and can store a potentially large number of data blocks.

The initial state of each profile machine is state 0 and all local variables are initially set to empty. The inter-process shared variable MEDIUM initially contains the address of one station in its DA field. Therefore, the initial system state tuple is (0,...,0) and the first transition taken by a station holding the token will be xmit\_time, or xmit\_msg.

Each profile machine has 10 states. In the initial state, 0, the station is quiescent, merely waiting for an incoming message, a transmit message signal, or a transmit time synchronization signal. If a frame appears in the variable MEDIUM with the network node's own address, the transition to state 1 is taken. When taking the xmit\_time transition, in state 2, the station transmits the data blocks that it has via Transfer, moving to state 3. In state 3, the station transmits the data blocks it has, moving to state 8. As specified by the SAFENET standard synchronization frames are sent via the ISO CLNP Protocol [HDBK92] page. 37. In state 8, the data blocks are formed into datagrams and transmitted, moving to state 9. In state 9, the station transmits any data blocks it has moving to state 10. In state 10, the station transmits until its token holding time expires or all it messages are sent; the station then returns to state 0. When taking the xmit msg transition, in state 4, the station transmits the blocks that it has, moving to either state 3 or state 5. If in state 3, the station transmits the data blocks it has moving to states 6, 7, or 8; this transition is based on the message size and its destination address' location. If in state 5, the station transmits the data blocks it has moving to states 6, 7, 8, or 9; From states 5, 6, 7, or 8, the station transmits its data blocks, moving to state 9. In state 9, the station transmits any data blocks it has moving to state 10. In state 10, the station transmits until its token holding time expires or all of its messages are sent; the station then returns to state 0.

The receiving profile station, like all other stations not in possession of the token, will be in state 0. The message will appear in MEDIUM, with the receiving station's address in the DA field. The receive transition to state 1 will be taken. In state 1 the data block is copied and the MEDIUM is cleared by the ready transition. By clearing the MEDIUM, the receiving station enables the sending station to return to its initial state (0) or its sending state (10)

For this simplified high-level specification, the channels inter-process and intraprocess are assumed to be error free. This means that the clearing of the medium by the receiver can be taken as an acknowledgment by the sender. Hence, there is no requirement for timers, time-outs or error checking on the channel. Although some of the finer details of the Lightweight profile are omitted, this specification contains the main idea of the Lightweight profile, and provides sufficient detail for the generation of a test sequence.

**Table 3: LIGHTWEIGHT PREDICATE-ACTIONS** 

Transition	nnnummummummmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm	Actio <b>n</b>
receive	MEDIUM.DA = i	inbuf ← MEDIUM
ready	true	$MEDIUM \leftarrow \emptyset$
xmit_time	outbuf(n) $\neq \emptyset \land$ outbuf(n) t = true	Transfer $\leftarrow$ outbuf (n) $\wedge$ outbuf (n) $\leftarrow \emptyset$
sts_msg	sts_msg (t, data) = (true, msg)	Transfer ← sts_msg
xmit_msg	xmit_msg ≠ Ø	Transfer $\leftarrow$ xmit_msg $\land$ xmit_msg $\leftarrow \emptyset$
lightwt_cl_msg (lwcm)	lwcm ≠Ø	Transfer $\leftarrow$ lwcm $\wedge$ lwcm $\leftarrow$ $\emptyset$
xfer_xtp_msg (xxm)	xxm ≠Ø	Transfer $\leftarrow$ xxm $\wedge$ xxm $\leftarrow \emptyset$
cl_msg (xpm)	xpm(t, cl) = (true, true)	Transfer $\leftarrow$ xpm $\wedge$ xpm $\leftarrow \emptyset$
xtp_rte_msg (xrm)	_xrm (t, es) = (true, true)	Transfer $\leftarrow$ xrm $\wedge$ xrm $\leftarrow \emptyset$
xtp_rte_msg (xrm)	xrm (t, is) = (true, true)	Transfer $\leftarrow$ xrm $\wedge$ xrm $\leftarrow$ $\emptyset$
xtp_rte_msg (xrm)	xrm (t, cl) = (true, true)	Transfer' $\leftarrow$ xrm $\wedge$ xrm $\leftarrow \emptyset$
es/is_msg	es/is_msg ≠ Ø	Transfer $\leftarrow$ es/is_msg $\land$ es/is_msg $\leftarrow \emptyset$
is/is_msg	is/is_msg ≠ Ø	Transfer $\leftarrow$ is/is_msg $\land$ is/is_msg $\leftarrow \varnothing$
clnp_msg	clnp_msg ≠ Ø	Transfer $\leftarrow$ clnp_msg $\land$ clnp_msg $\leftarrow \emptyset$
xtp_msg	xtp_msg ≠ Ø	Transfer $\leftarrow$ xtp_msg $\land$ xtp_msg $\leftarrow \emptyset$
llc_msg	llc_msg ≠Ø	Transfer ← llc_msg ∧ llc_msg ← Ø
msg_sent	true	MEDIUM ← Ø




Figure 10 Lightweight Profile Specification

Each machine within the Lightweight profile in Figure 10 performs the following:

- State 0 In the initial state, the machine is quiescent, merely waiting to process a request or transmission.
- State 1 In the receive state, the machine copies an incoming message from the bus and acknowledges receipt of the message by clearing the bus.
- State 2 The SAFENET Time Service protocol provides for the distribution of time information and the synchronization of distributed clocks within a system.
- State 3 In addition to Lightweight and Xpress Transfer Protocol support, the OSI Connectionless transport protocol directly supports STS's protocol data unit transfer. It provides the user with the ability to transmit a single unit of data, datagram, without the requirement of a connection being established.
- State 4 The Lightweight application services consist of a set of communication service primitives which can be implemented to provide a user with direct, efficient data transfer capabilities.
- State 5 The Xpress Transfer protocol provides services which achieve increased efficiency and performance by combining the connection process with the data transfer process.
- State 6 The ISO End System-to-Intermediate System routing exchange protocol passes address information among all stations that are on the same LAN segment or through intermediate stations. The ES/IS protocol provides stations with the ability to associate a data link layer address with a given network layer address.
- State 7 The ISO Intermediate System-to-Intermediate System intra-domain routing protocol provides SAFENET networks with dynamic determination of routes used to pass data between intermediate systems.
- State 8 The ISO Connectionless Network protocol provides services for network routing and for the segmentation and reassembly of transport layer messages that are too large for the underlying communications service. Additionally, the ISO CLNP has multicast data transfer capability, but limits the scope of transfers to users on a single LAN segment.
- State 9 The Logical Link Control protocol provides three services: Unacknowledged connectionless service which supports point-to-point, multipoint and broadcast in a datagram style of service, Connection-oriented services which provides flow control, sequencing, and error recovery, Acknowledged connectionless service which provides for acknowledgment of individual frames and supports point-to-point transfers.
- State 10 The FDDI Token LAN protocol provides the ability to get data on and off the physical medium in a controlled manner.

t = time; DA = destination address; SA = source address




Figure 11 Lightweight Network Nodes Data Structure

### 3. Lightweight Test Sequence Generation

First the preliminary steps are carried out; these steps determine the exact format of the tests. The measures employed are primarily concerned with input and output variables. After the preliminary steps, the tests are generated. For ease of reference the numbering below corresponds to the steps in the test procedure.

### a. Preliminary Steps

- (1) From Figure 10's Lightweight profile specification finite state diagram, we see that all transition labels are unique; therefore, no action is required.
- (2) All transitions have single clause enabling predicates; therefore, no action is required.
- (3) The shared variable MEDIUM is both an input and an output variable; therefore it is split into two variables MEDIUM<sub>I</sub> and MEDIUM<sub>O</sub> for testing purposes. The intra-process shared variable Transfer is both an input and an output variable; therefore it is split into two variables Transfer<sub>I</sub> and Transfer<sub>O</sub> for testing purposes
- (4) The local variables outbuf, sts\_msg, lightwt\_cl\_msg, cl\_msg, xtp\_rte\_msg, xtp\_msg, llc\_msg, xmit\_msg, xfer\_xtp\_msg, clnp\_msg, es/is\_msg and is/is\_msg are both input and output variables; therefore they are split into two respective variables, for example xmit\_msg\_ and xmit\_msg\_, for testing purposes.

Note that in step 2, the xtp\_rte\_msg and xmit\_time are not separated into two different clauses because both conditions must be true for the transition to be enabled.

From these preliminary steps, we can see that the test will adhere to the following form:

 $S_{I}\,MEDIUM_{I}\,Transfer_{I}\,outbuf_{I}...\,llc\_msg_{I}\,/\,MEDIUM_{O}\,Transfer_{O}\,outbuf_{O}...$   $llc\_msg_{O}\,inbuf\,S_{E}$ 

Now we are ready to begin generating the test sequence.

### b. Test Sequence Generation

- (1) We begin in the initial state, 0. In step 2 we may choose any untested transition emanating from state 0; we select the xmit\_msg transition.
- 2(a) According to the predicate-action table, to enable this transition the local variable xmit\_msg must contain data for processing and the DA field of xmit\_msg is assumed to be state 4's address. The remaining fields may have any values, and are indicated by an "x" in Table 4. The other input variables are set to DC for "don't care."
- 2(b) When the transition occurs, Transfer copies the data from xmit\_msg, and xmit\_msg is set to empty.
  - 2(c) S<sub>E</sub> is set to the expected end state for this test, which is state 4.
- (3) Noting that the next state is a stop state, this completes the first test in the sequence, and the appropriate values are shown in Table 4.
  - (4) This clause and transition are now marked "tested."
- (5) The value of  $S_I$  is now set to 4 and another iteration starting at step 4 is called for.

The next iteration of the procedure arbitrarily selects the lightwt\_cl\_msg transition, and the values selected are shown as the fourth test entered in Table 4. The expected ending state for this fourth test is 3.

At the next iteration, the cl\_msg transition is taken; the expected ending state for this fifth test is 8. From state 8, we take the clnp\_msg transition. The expected ending state resulting from this transition is 9. From state 9, we take the llc\_msg transition; the expected ending state for this seventh test is 10. From state 10, we exercise the msg\_sent transition using the "true" predicate, which leads back to the initial state.

The remaining untested transitions are executed in a similar manner resulting in a final test sequence of 32 steps. The values of the input and output variables for all of these tests are shown in Table 4.

x.DA.x. is/is msg<sub>1</sub> x,DA,x,x es/is msg<sub>1</sub> xtp rte\_msg<sub>1</sub> x,DA,x,E,ET,x x,DA,x,T.F.F. x,DA,x,F,T,F, **Table 4: TEST SEQUENCE FOR THE LIGHTWEIGHT PROFILE** x,DA,x,F,F,T,x x,DA,x,F,F,T,x cl\_msg1 xfer xtp msg<sub>1</sub> A,DA,A,A x,DA,x,x r,DA,x,x x,DA,x,F.F.T,x lightwt cl m§g<sub>l</sub> xmit msg<sub>I</sub> K,DA,K,K x,DA,x,x x,DA,x,x x,DA,x,x T.DA.x.x sts\_ msg<sub>1</sub> 2222 222 DC 20 22 X DC DC  $\Sigma$ DC  $\Xi$ 22222 88888 8888 20 TDA DC 222 20 Transfer MEDIUM 2 2222 2 2222 10 Š 10 6 xmit\_msg lightwt\_cl\_msg xfer\_xtp\_msg 16 xfer\_xtp\_msg 17 xtp\_rte\_msg 18 is/is\_msg xfer\_xtp\_msg xtp\_rte\_msg xtp\_rte\_msg 26 msg\_sent 27 xmit\_time es/is\_msg llc\_msg xmit\_msg llc\_msg msg\_sent Transition chp\_msg xmit\_msg xmit\_msg llc\_msg msg\_sent clnp\_msg msg\_sent msg\_sent llc\_msg sts\_msg clnp\_msg cl\_msg 25 llc\_msg cl\_msg receive ready 15 6

xtp rte-ms<del>§</del>o Ø 0 Ø Table 4: TEST SEQUENCE FOR THE LIGHTWEIGHT PROFILE (CONTINUED) cl\_msgo Ø Ø xfer xtp\_msgo Ø Ø Ø lightwt cl msgo Ø xmit msgo Ø Ø Ø Ø outbufo sts\_msgo Ø DC 88888888 22 DC DC DC 888 Z Z 2 2 DC DC DC 2 2 22 Z 2 2 2 30 222 X 8 8 8 8 8 2 8 8 X ă ĸ 2 2 2 Z **MR M** 2 2 2 Z x,x,SA,F,F,T,x 1,1,5A,1 1,1,5A,T,F,5x 1,1,5A,1 1,1,5A,1 x,x,SA,F,F,T,x x,x,SA,F,T,F,x x,x,SA,F,F,T,x x,x,SA,F,F,T,x Transfer<sub>0</sub> x,x,SA,x x,x,SA,x x,x,SA,x x,x,SA,x x,x,SA,x x,x,SA,x x,x,SA,x 1,1,SA,1 x,x,SA,x T.x,SA,x x,x,SA,x 1,1,SA,1 x,x,SA,x x,x,SA,x K,K,SA,K MEDIUMO 20 Ø 3 0 Ø Ø 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 8 8 8 2 2 2 2 8 Z 8 2222 ≥ Z Z lk\_msg1 x,DA,x,x x,DA,x,x x,DA,x,x x,DA,x,x x,DA,x,x xtp\_msg1 clnp\_msg1 x,DA,x,x x,DA,x,x x,DA,x,x 6

Table 4: TEST SEQUENCE FOR THE LIGHTWEIGHT PROFILE (CONTINUED) ္ရ 10 10 10 01 ∞ 0 0 9 ∞ 4 0 SE x,x,SA,x,x inbuf llc\_msgo Ø Ø Ø 0 Ø is/is\_msgo\_clnp\_msgo\_v\*o\_msgo 0 Ø Ø Ø es/is\_msgo Ø 2 8 91

## VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### A. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS RESEARCH

The goal of this thesis was to present a series of test sequences for the SAFENET communication protocol. The procedure takes as input high level SAFENET profiles that are specified as a system of communicating machines, and gives as output, complete test sequences for SAFENET's OSI and Lightweight profiles. A brief specification of SAFENET's OSI and Lightweight profiles was given using the system of communicating machines model, and test sequences were generated.

The test method described and employed here further demonstrates the flexibility of the system of communicating machines model. A protocol can be specified, verified, and tested using techniques based on this model. The concept was expanded and applied to a high level profile which encompassed several protocols. In the test procedure, all transition instances in the finite state machine specification is tested in conjunction with each enabling predicate clause. The preliminary steps were employed to determine the input and output variables; the sequence generating procedure was employed to assist in fault coverage. The example test sequences for the OSI and Lightweight profiles were used to demonstrate the application of the specification and testing methods associated with the system of communicating machines model. Since these profiles have the potential for wide spread use in present and future naval combatants, their existence as system of communicating machines model further illustrate the applicability and usefulness of this method. Utilizing a protocol specification method which places emphasis on testing yields better results than using a specification method that was not designed with conformance testing in mind.

Some of the current literature discusses the correctness of a test sequence; their apparent emphasis is on shortening the sequence length. However, the system of communicating machine test procedure emphasizes the ability of the sequence to detect errors rather than the achievement of an optimal test sequence length. This test method can

only test for the presence of desirable behavior in a protocol or profile machine. Given the current level of technology, it is not practical to exhaustively test for the presence of undesirable behavior since all possible errors that could occur in an implementation can not be foreseen.

#### B. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The issue of security services for data on platforms with a SAFENET implementation exercising data transfers of multiple classifications will have to be addressed. Commercial LANs have encountered and solved this problem with respect to sharing a LAN with a competitor, but with the performance constraints placed upon SAFENET, the completed risk analysis should provide some definitive system configuration with respect to security services. Consequently, research effort must be expended to directly address this issue.

With this test method being as straight forward and easy to apply as it is, it should lend itself very well to automation; research into to the feasibility of this could possibly prove very valuable in the wide spread acceptance of this test method. Further research could concentrate on decomposing the protocols within a SAFENET profile and applying the test method. In addition, future research could concentrate on extending the error detection capabilities to detect multiple errors or to detect them in the presence of converging transitions.

xmit p ivate msg<sub>1</sub> map msg xmit private\_ xmit clear map\_msg1 Table 2: TEST SEQUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE xmit clear x msg<sub>I</sub> A.x.F.F.T. A.x.F.F.T. LEET xmit\_priv xmit\_clear ate\_logica logical\_ l\_msg1 msg1 private msg<sub>I</sub> T,DA,x,x sts\_ msg<sub>1</sub> 22 2222 22 22222 8888888888  $\frac{\text{outbuf}_1}{(1,2)}$ **422** 22222 888888888 2 2 20 2 DC 22 MEDIUM, Transfer 2828 2 <u>x</u> 22222222 2 18 14 16 18 S 9 6 llc\_msg msg\_sent xmit\_clear\_msg I presentation\_msg 19presentation\_msg 27presentation\_msg co\_trans\_msg 25 xmit\_clear\_msg 7 xmit\_clear\_msg 12 session\_msg 13 co\_trans\_msg session\_msg 21 co\_trans\_msg cl\_trans\_msg 20 session\_msg is/is\_msg msg\_sent Transition llc\_msg xmit\_time Oftam\_msg 4 es/is\_msg 8 ftam\_msg 26 ftam\_msg clnp\_msg 6 msg\_sent 2 is/is\_msg 24 msg\_sent sts\_msg 15 llc\_msg 23 llc\_msg receive ready 59

Table 2: TEST SEQUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE

				i							747		
				outh	_	Г	_	ving name	xmit_clear	xmit	xmit clear	xmit	xmit pr
Transition	$S_{\rm I}$	DIUM	Transfer	:_:\	_	msgı	private msg <sub>l</sub>	are rogica I_msg <sub>I</sub>	msg <sub>1</sub> msg <sub>1</sub>	msg <sub>1</sub>	map_msg <sub>1</sub>	private map_msg	ivate msg <sub>I</sub>
33 xmit_clear_msg	0	DC	DC	ЭC	$\mathbf{DC}$				q	DA.A.F.F.F.T.F.X	F.x		
34 acse_msg	10	DC	DC	2	2								
3 Spresentation_msg	14	DC	) (	20	ЭG								
	15	DC	20		DC								
37 co_trans_msg	16	DC	DC	DC	<u> </u>								
38 es/is_msg	4	DC	20	DC	20								
39 Ilc_msg	11	DC	DC	2	2								
_	18	DC	20	DC	DC								
41 xmit_clear_msg	0	DC	DC	ЭG	20				d	1,x,F,F,F,T	F,x		
42 acse_msg	10	DC	DC	DC	DC								
43presentation_msg	14	DC	20	20	DC								
44 session_msg	15	DC	DC	١.	DC								
45 co_trans_msg	16	DC	DC	20	20								
46 is/is_msg	5	DC	DC	20	200								
47 Ilc_msg	17	DC	DC	DC	DC								
48 msg_sent	81	DC	DC		<b>DC</b>								
	0	DC	20	2	20				d	1,x,F,F,F,T	F,x		
50 acse_msg	10	DC	DC		20								
51presentation_msg	14	DC	DC	20	$\mathcal{C}$								
52 session_msg	15	DC	DC	20	DC								
53 co_trans_msg	16	DC	DC	20	DC								
54 clnp_msg	9	DC	20		DC								
55 Ilc_msg	17	DC	20		DС								
56 msg_sent	18	DC	DC		C								
57 xmit_clear_msg	0	DC	20	C	20				YO	T.F.F.F.T	F,x		
58 smase_msg	11	DC	DC	20	ЭG					Γ			
58 cmise_msg	12	DC	DC	DC	DC								
60 rose_msg	13	DC	)C	20	DC								
61 presentation_msg	14	DC	DC	DC	DC								
62 session_msg	15	DC	2		20								
63co_trans_msg	9	DC	2	J	20								
64 is/is_msg	4	DC	DC	DC	100								

Table 2: TEST SEQUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE

		ı		Ian	7 7. IL		CHIN	TABLE 2. I EST SEQUENCE FOR THE USI FRUFILE	IL OSI F	NOF	LE		
Transition	tion	is	DIUM	Transfer	outbuf <sub>I</sub> (1,2)	sts_ msg <sub>1</sub>	private msg <sub>1</sub>	xmit_priv ate_logica l_msg <sub>1</sub>	xmit clear logical msg <sub>1</sub>	xmit clear msg <sub>I</sub>	xmit clear map_msg <sub>l</sub>	xmit private map msg	xmit_pr ivate msg <sub>1</sub>
8sm_oll 59	nsg	17	DC DC	2	M M M								
8sm 99	msg_sent	18	DC	2	20 20								
67 xmit	67 xmit_clear_msg	0	DC	DC	20	C			D.	,x,F,F,F,F	T,x		
68 smas	smase_msg	11	DC	20	2C 2C								
69 cmis	cmise_msg	12	DC	20									
70 rose	rose_msg	13	DC	20	i								
71 presen	71 presentation_msg	14	22	2	DC DC								
72 sessi	session_msg	15	22	2	1								
73 co_b	co_trans_msg	16	200	×	2 2 2								
74 is/is_	is/is_msg	5	DC	DC	20 20								
75 Ilc_msg	nsg	17	DC	20	20 20								
3sm 9/	msg_sent	18	DC	<b>DC</b>	20 20								
77 xmit_c	7 xmit_clear_msg	0	DC	20	2G 2G				Đ	,x,F,F,F,F	T,x		
78 smas	smase_msg	11	DC	20	1								
simo 6L	cmise_msg	12	DC	<b>DC</b>	1								
80 rose_msg	msg	13	DC	20									
8 present	8 presentation_msg	14	DC	DC	20 20								
85 sessi	session_msg	15	DC	DC	1								
¶-∞ €8	co_trans_msg	16	DC	DC	DC DC								i
84 clnp	clnp_msg	9	DC	DC	DC DC								
85 llc_msg	nsg	17	DC	DC	DC DC								
86 msg_sent	sent	18	DC	DC	od od								
87xmit_cle	87xmit_clear_logical_ms	0	DC	DC					DA,x,F,T,F,F,				
88 xmit cle	88 xmit clear map msg	8	DC	DC	DC DC	í					DA.x.F.T.T.F.F.x		
89 fram	ftam_msg	6	DC	DC	oc oc								
90 present	90 presentation_msg	14	DC	DC	oc oc								
o) sessi	session_msg	15	DC	DC	DC DC								
92 ∞_π	co_trans_msg	16	DC	DC	DC DC								
η3 es/is	es/is_msg	4	DC	DC	DC DC								
	nsg	-2	1)C	DC	DC DC								
95 msg_sent	sent	<b>≈</b>	DC	DC									
96mil cle	96mil clear logical ms	Ξ	DC	nc	)C )C				DAXETTEE			-	
		l			I								

Table 2: TEST SEQUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE

				outbuf	_		xmit priv	kmit clear	xmit	xmit clear	xmit	xmit_pr
Transition	$S_1$	MEDIUM <sub>1</sub> Transfer <sub>1</sub>	Transfer	(1,2)	msgl	msg <sub>1</sub>	I_msg <sub>1</sub>	nogical msg <sub>l</sub>	msg <sub>l</sub>	map_msg <sub>l</sub>	private map_msg <sub>l</sub>	msgi
97 xmit clear map msg	œ	DC	DC							DA.x.F.T.T.F.F.x		
98 ftam_msg	6	DC	20	DC DC								
99 presentation_msg	14	DC	) ) (									
100 session_msg	15	DC	DC									
101 co_trans_msg	16	DC	DC	DC DC								
102 is/is_msg	5	20	20	DC DC								
103 "c_msg	17	2	2	2G 2G								
104 msg_sent	18	20	DC DC	od od								
rical	08sm	DC	20	DC DC				DA,x,F,T,T,F,F,x				
106zmit_clear_map_msg	8	DC	DC	DC DC						A,x,F,T,T,F,F,x		
107 ftam_msg	6	DC	DC	DC DC								
108presentation_msg	14	20	2									
109 session_msg	15	DC	20	DC DC								
110 co_trans_msg	16	DC	DC									
111 clnp_msg	9	DC	DC				,					
112 llc_msg	171	DC	20	DC DC								
113 msg_sent	18	DC	DC	DC DC								
114xmil_clear_logical_msg0	08	DC	20					DA,x,F,T,F,T,F,X				
115xmit clear_map_msg	8	DC	DC	DC DC						DA,x,F,T,F,T,F,x		
116 acse_msg	10	DC	DC	DC DC								
11 Presentation_msg	14	DC	DC	DC DC								
118 session_msg	15	DC	DC	DC DC								
119 co_trans_msg	91	DC	20	DC DC								
120 es/is_msg	4	DC	)C	DC DC								
121 llc_msg	17	DC	DC	DC DC								
122 msg_sent	18	DC	20	DC DC								
123xmit clear logical ms	088	DC	DC	DC DC				DA,x,F,T,F,T,F,x				
124xmit_clear_map_msg	8	DC	DC	DC DC						DA,x,F,T,F,T,F,x		
125 acse_msg	10	DC	DC	DC DC								
12(presentation_ms)	7	DC	DC	1								
127 session_msg	2	DC	2	20 20								
128 co_trans_msg	16	DC	nc	DC DC								

Table 2: TEST SEQUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE

	ı		1001	100 T 100 T		7		7 7 7 7 7			7777		
Transition	Sı	MEDIUM	Transfer	$_{(1,2)}^{\text{outbuf}_{I}}$		sts_ msg <sub>1</sub>	private msg <sub>l</sub>	xmit_priv ate_logica l_msgi	xmit clear logical msg <sub>1</sub>	xmit clear msg <sub>1</sub>	xmit_clear map_msg <sub>1</sub>	xmit private map_msg <sub>1</sub>	xmit_pr ivate msg <sub>1</sub>
129 1s/1s_msg	^	20	20	2	20								
130 IIc_msg	11		2	l	2								
131 msg_sent	18	20	DC	DC	200								
132xmit_clear_logical_n	083	<b>DC</b>	DC		DC				DA,x.F.T.F.T.F.x				
133xmit_clear_map_ms	8	DC	DC	DC	DC						DA,x.F.T.F.T.F.x		
134 acse_msg	10	20	20		20								
135 presentation_msg	14	<b>DC</b>	DC	2	20								
136 session_msg	15	20	20	2	20								
137 co_trans_msg	16	DC	20		20								
138 clnp_msg	9	DC	DC	20	DC								
139 Ilc_msg	17	DC	20	20	DC								
140 msg_sent	18	DC	)OC		200								
14 [xmit_clear_logical_m	08	DC	20	2	20				DA,x.F.T.F.F.T.x				
142 xmit_clear_map_ms	8	DC	) DC	20	20						DA,x,F,T,F,F,T,x		
143 smase_msg	[11]	20	DC	DC	DC								
144 cmise_msg	12	DC	20		20								
145 rose_msg	13	DC	)C		DC.								
146 presentation_msg	14	DC	20	20	20								
147 session_msg	15	DC	20	2	Ж								
148 co_trans_msg	16	DC	DC	2	2	·							
149 es/is_msg	4	DC	DC	2	20								
150 llc_msg	17	DC	DC	2	DC								
151 msg_sent	18	DC	20	2	DC								
152mit_clear_logical_mg 0	8.0	DC	DC	2	20				DA,x,F,T,F,F,T,x				
153 amit_clear_map_ms	8	DC	DC	20	DC						DA.x.F.T.F.F.T.x		
154 smase_msg	11	DC	20	DC	Ж								
155 cmise_msg	12	DC	)C	2	$\Sigma$								
156 rose_msg	13	DC	20	20	20								
157 presentation msg	14	DC	20	20	20								
	15	DC	DC	DC	DC								
159 co_trans_msg	19	DC	2	$\cong$	$\simeq$								
16() is/is_msg	5	DC	1)C	DC	DC								

Table 2: TEST SEQUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE

	Ì				İ		I						
	- (			outbuf		sts		ate logica	ear	1.	xmit clear	xmit private	xmit_private
	SI	MEDIUMI	Iransfer	ב	_		msg <sub>1</sub>		msg <sub>1</sub>	msg <sub>1</sub>	map_msgl	map_msg1	msg <sub>1</sub>
161 llc_msg	17	DC	DC	20	120								
162 msg_sent	18	DC	DC	20	) (1)								
163 amit_clear_logical_ris	085	DC	DC	20	20				DA,x,F,T,F,F,T,x				
164xmit_cloar_map_ms	8	DC	DC	DC	DC						DA.X.F.T.F.F.T.		
165 smase_msg	11	DC	DC	20	20								
166 cmise_msg	12	DC	20	DC	20								
167 rose_msg	13	DC	2	2	8								
168 presentation_msg	14	20	)C	20	2								
169 session_msg	151	DC	20	20	8								
170 co_trans_msg	16	DC	DC	20	20								
171 clnp_msg	9	DC	DC	20	20							j	
172 llc_msg	17	DC	DC	<b>DC</b>	DC								
173 msg_sent	18	DC	DC	1	200								ļ
174 private_msg	0	DC	20		20		A.X.T.T.F.F.	Υ.					
xmit_private_logical_ms	7	20	DC	DC	рc			DA.X,T,T,F,F,					
176amit_private_map_msg 8	8 8	DC	20		20							DA,x,T,T,T,F,F,	
177 fram_msg	6	20	DC		DC								
178 presentation_msg	14	20	DC		20								
179 session_msg	15	<b>DC</b>	20	DC	20								
180 co_trans_msg	16	DC	20	2	20								
181 es/is_msg	4	20	DC	2	20								
182 llc_msg	17	DC	DC	20	DC								
183 msg_sent	18	20	DC	DC	20								
184 private_msg	0	DC	20	2	DС	Ġ	A,x,T,T,T,F,						
amit private logical ms	7	DC	DC	20	20		1	DA.x,T,T,T,F,F,					
186xmit_private_map_mg 8	8 5	20	20	20	<u> </u>							DA.x.T.T.F.F.	
187 ftam_msg	6	DC	DC	20	ЭG								
188 presentation_msg	14	DC	20	20	<b>DC</b>								
189 session msg	15	DC	DC		$\mathcal{C}$								j
1900co_trans_msg	91	DC	20	ŀĮ	20								
191 is/is_msg	2	2	2	2	2								
192 llc_msg	17	DC	DC	2	DC								

Table 2: TEST SEOUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE

Transition	SI	MEDIUM	Transfer	$\underset{(1,2)}{\text{outbuf}_{\mathbf{I}}}$	sts_ msg <sub>1</sub>	private msg <sub>l</sub>	xmii priv ate logica 1 msgi	xmit clearxn logical cle msg <sub>1</sub> m	xmit clear msg <sub>I</sub>	xmit clear map_msg <sub>1</sub>	xmit private map msg	xmit_p ivate msg <sub>1</sub>
193 msg_sent	8	×	3	20 20								
194 private_msg	0	2	2			DA.x.T,T,F	F,x					
xmit_private_logical_mag	F	20	20	200			DA.x.T.T.F.F.x					
196mi private map m	88	DC	DC	DC DC						DA,x,T,T,T,F,F,x		
197 fram_msg	6	DC	DC	DC DC								
198 presentation_msg	14	20	2	ļ.								
199 session_msg	15	2	2	DC DC								
200 co_trans_msg	91	2	2	ı								
201 clnp_msg	9	20	200	DC DC								
202 llc_msg	11	DC	20	oa oa								
203 msg_sent	81	DC	20	od od								
204 private_msg	0	2	8	20 20		DA,x,T,T,F,T	F,x					
xmit_private_logical_msg	7	2	2	200			DA,x,T,T,F,T,F,x					
206mil_private_map_m	88	8	2	20 20	L					DA.A.T.T.F.T.F.R		
207 acse_msg	01	DC	20									
208 presentation_msg	14	DC	20	DC DC								
209 session_msg	15	DC	DC	DC DC								
210 co_trans_msg	91	DC	20	DC DC								
211 es/is_msg	4	DC	20	DC DC								
212 llc_msg	17	DC	DC	oc oc								
213 msg_sent	18	DC	)C	DC DC								
214 private_msg	0	DC	DC	DC DC		DA,x,T,T,F,T	F,X					
amit private logical msg	7	DC	20				DA,x.T,T,F,T,F,x					
216tmit private map m	88	DC	DC	DC DC						DA,x,T,T,F,T,F,x		
217 acse_msg	01	DC	)C	od od								
218 presentation msg	14	DC	DC	oc oc								
gsm_noisses 612	15	22	2	DC DC								
220 co_trans_msg	91	DC	)C	DC DC								
221 is/is_msg	5	DC	DC	DC DC								
222 Ilc_msg	17	DC	DC	l								
223 msg_sent	18	DC	CC	DC DC								
224 private_msg	0	DC	DC	DC DC		A,x,T,T,F,T	¥'S					
				ı								I

Table 2: TEST SEQUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE

					Γ			xmit priv xmit clear xmit	xmit clear	xmif	1.	xmif	xmit pr
Transition	$\mathbf{S}_{\mathbf{I}}$	DIUM	Transfer	0utbuf $(1,2)$	uf <sub>1</sub> 2)	sts_ msg <sub>I</sub>	private msg <sub>I</sub>	ate logica I msg <sub>1</sub>	logical clear msg <sub>1</sub> msg <sub>1</sub>	clear msg <sub>1</sub>	xmit clear map_msg <sub>1</sub>	private map msg	
amit private logical ms	1	DC	) (1)	20	$\mathfrak{DC}$			DA,x,T,T,F,T,F,y					
226 mit private map mg 8	88	DC	CC	C	DC							A.X.T.T.F.T.F.	
227 acse_msg	10	DC	DC	2	DC								
228 presentation_msg	14	DC	DC	20	20								
229 session_msg	15	DC	20	20	20								
230 co_trans_msg	91	20	20	2	20								
231 clnp_msg	9	22	2	8	20								
232 Ilc_msg	17	20	2	2	2								
233 msg_sent	18	DC	20	2	20								
234 private_msg	0	DC	DC	2	20		DA,x,T,T,F,HT,x	Т,л					
amit private logical ms	7	DC	DC	DC	$\Sigma$			DA,x,T,T,F,F,T,x					
236xmit_private_map_mg 8	88	DC	20	2	20							DAXTTEFT	
237 smase_msg	11	DC	2	2	2								
238 cmise_msg	12	DC	DC	20	20								
239 rose_msg	13	DC	20	2	DC								
240 presentation_msg	14	DC	20	2	20								
241 session_msg	15	DC	20	20	DC								
242 co_trans_msg	16	20	20	2	20								
243 es/is_msg	4	DC	22	20	20								
244 llc_msg	17	DC	)C	2	DC								
245 msg_sent	18	DC	DC	DC	DC								
246 private_msg	0	DC	DC	20	20	7	DA, T.T.F.F	T, x					
amit_private_logical_msg	7	DC	DC	20	$\mathcal{D}C$			DA,x,T,T,F,F,T,x					
248xmit_private_map_m	88	DC	20	20	$\infty$							A.x.T.T.F.F.T.	
249 smase_msg	111	DC	DC	20	) OC								
250 cmise_msg	12	DC	)C	2	Ж								
251 rose_msg	13	DC	DC	DC	DС								
252 presentation msg	14	DC	DC	20	DC								
253 session_msg	15	DC	DC	DC	DC								
254 co_trans_msg	16	DC	<u>DC</u>	22	DC								
255 is/is_msg	5	DC	C	nc	nc								
256 llc_msg	17	DC	nc	IJĊ	)C								
	İ				ĺ								

Table 2: TEST SEQUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE

	1									I			
				outb	uf,			xmit priv	xmit clear		xmit clear	xmit	xmit_pr
Transition	$S_{\rm I}$	MEDIUM <sub>I</sub> Transfer <sub>1</sub>	Transfer	(1,2)	5).	$msar{g}_{I}$	private msg <sub>1</sub>	I_msg <sub>I</sub>	msg <sub>1</sub>		map_msg <sub>1</sub>	private map_msg	msg <sub>1</sub>
257 msg_sent	81	DC	DC	ЭG	120								
258 private_msg	0	DC	DC	20	DC	D	DA,x,T,T,F,F,T	х					
xmit_private_logical_msg	7	DC	DC	20	$\infty$			DA,x,T,T,F,F,T,					
260xmit private map msg8	83	DC	DC	20	20							A,x,T,T,F,F,T,	
261 smase_msg	11	DC	DC	C	DC								
262 cmise_msg	12	DC	DC	20	DC								
263 rose_msg	13	DC	DC	20	ЭC								
264 presentation msg	14	DC	DC	20	DC								
265 session_msg	15	DC	DC	20	<u>DC</u>								
266 co_trans_msg	16	DC	DC	20	Ж								
267 clnp_msg	9	DC	DC	20	20								
268 llc_msg	17	DC	DC	20	DC								
269 msg_sent	18	DC	DC	20	) (								
270 private_msg	Ō	DC	DC	DC	20	d .	A,x,T,F,T,F,F						
27 Jxmit_private_msg	1	DC	DC	ЭG	DC							VQ	x,T.F.T.F.F.
272 fram_msg	6	DC	DC	20	DC								
273 presentation msg	14	DC	DC	2	DC								
274 session_msg	15	DC	DC	2	DC								
275 co_trans_msg	16	DC	DC	2	20								
276 es/is_msg	4	DC	DC	20	20								
277 Uc_msg	11	20	DC	2	20								
278 msg_sent	18	DC	DC	20	DC								
279 private_msg	0	DC	DC	20	2	ū	A.x.T.F.T.F.F	ı					
280kmit_private_msg	1	DC	DC	20	20							DA	DA x,T,F,T,F,F,y
281 ftam_msg	6	DC	DC	2	$\Sigma$								
282 presentation msg	14	DC	DC	2	DC								
283 session_msg	15	DC	DC	DC	DC								
284 co_trans_msg	16	DC	DC	2	C								
285 is/is_msg	5	DC	DC	DC	nc								
286 Ilc_msg	17	20	DC	DC	$\mathcal{C}$								
287 msg_sent	∞	DC	DC	2	2								
288 private_msg	0	DC	DC	DC	CC	Ţ	A.x,T,F,T,F,H	,					

Table 2: TEST SEQUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE

			Jan			ץ ב		ADIC 2. 1EST SEQUENCE FOR THE USIT NOTHER	110 001		1117		
Transition	S	MEDIUM	Transfer	outbuf <sub>I</sub> (1,2)		sts_ msg <sub>I</sub>	private msg <sub>l</sub>	xmit_priv ate_logica l_msg <sub>l</sub>	xmit clear xmit logical clear msg <sub>1</sub> msg <sub>1</sub>	xmit clear msg <sub>1</sub>	xmit_clear map_msg <sub>l</sub>	xmit private map msg	xmit_pr ivate msg_
289 amit private mag	F	DC	DC	20	8							ΡΑ	I,T.F.T.F.F.
	6	DC	20		20								
291 presentation msg	14	DC	2	1	Ø								
292 session_msg	15	DC	DC	DC	200								
293 co_trans_msg	16	DC	20	l I	20								
294 clnp_msg	9	DC	20	<u>Э</u> Д	20								
295 Ilc_msg	11	DC	20		$\approx$								
295 msg_sent	18	DC	DC	DC	20								
297 private_msg	0	DC	20	l I	20		DA,x,T,F,F,T	F,x					
298 xmit_private_msg	1	DC	) DC	20	20							<b>V</b> O	x,T.F.F.T.F.x
299 acse_msg	01	DC	20	20	20								
300 presentation msg	14	DC	DC		20								
301 session_msg	15	DC	DC		20								
302 co_trans_msg	91	DC	DC	20	20								
303 es/1s_msg	4	DC	) DC		<b>DC</b>								
304 Ilc_msg	17	DC	20		2								
305 msg_sent	18	DC	)C	1	20								
306 private_msg	0	DC	) )	DC	20		JA,x,T.F.F.T	F, x					
307 xmit_private_msg	1	DC	)Q		20							DA	a,T.F.F.T.F.
308 acse_msg	10	DC	DC	DC	DC								
309 presentation msg	. 14	DC	20	20	20								
310 session_msg	15	DC	DC		DC								
311 co_trans_msg	91	DC	DC	DC	200								
312 is/is_msg	5	DC	20	DC	20								
313 Ilc_msg	11	DC	<b>DC</b>	DC	DC								
314 msg_sent	18	DC	20	1 1	20								
315 private_msg	0	DC	20		20		DA,x,T,F,F,TF,x	F,x					
316 amit private msg	7	DC	20	20	C							DA	x,T.F.F.T.Ex
317 acse_msg	10	DC	DC	1 1	$\mathcal{C}$								
318 presentation msg	14	DC	DC	ı	20								
319 session msg	15	DC	SC	. 1	2								
320 co_trans_msg	161	DC	DC	)C	20								

Table 2: TEST SEQUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE

			Ian	(T. 115)	מניל	O ESTA	4	1E VOI 1	NOT	LE		
Transition	S	DIUM	Transfer	$\begin{array}{c} \text{outbuf}_{I} \\ (1,2) \end{array}$	sts_ msg <sub>I</sub>	private msg <sub>l</sub>	xmit_priv ate_logica l_msgi	v xmit clear xmit clear logical clear msg <sub>1</sub>		xmit_clear map_msg <sub>1</sub>	xmit private map msg	xmit_pr ivate msgl
321 clnp_msg	٥	) (1)	$\approx$	2020								
322 IIc_msg	17	DC	20									
323 msg_sent	18	20	DC	DC DC								
324 private_msg	0	DC	DC	DC DC	Ī	A,x,T,F,F,F,T	x					
325 amit_private_msg	7	DC	DC	od od							DA	DA x,T.F.F.F.T.x
326 smase_msg	11	22	22	ľ								
327 cmise_msg	12	DC	DC	DC DC								
328 rose_msg	13	DC	)C	od od								
329 presentation msg	14	DC	DC	1								
330 session_msg	15	DC	DC	DC DC								
331 co_trans_msg	16	DC	20	DC DC								
332 es/is_msg	4	20	2	DC DC								
333 Ilc_msg	17	20	2	1								
334 msg_sent	18	22	2	کر کر								
335 private_msg	0	22	8	1	7	A,x,T,F,F,F,T	×					
336 xmit_private_msg	7	DC	20	DC DC							PA	x,T,F,F,F,T,x
337 smase_msg	11	DC	20	oc oc								
338 cmise_msg	12	DC	DC	DC DC								
339 rose_msg	13	DC	20	DC DC								
340 presentation_msg	14	DC	DC	DC DC								
341 session_msg	15	DC	DC	DC DC								
342 co_trans_msg	16	DC	DC	DC DC								
343 es/is_msg	5	DC	DC	DC DC								
344 llc_msg	11	DC	20	oa oa								
345 msg_sent	18	DC	DC	DC DC								
346 private_msg	0	20	20	oc oc	1	A.x.T.F.F.F.T	¥					
347 xmit private msg	( )	DC	) )	DC DC							DA	x,T.F.F.F.T.x
348 smase_msg	11	DG.	DC	oa oa								
349 cmise_msg	12	DC	DC	DC DC								
	13	DC	20	li								
351 presentation msg	14	DC	20									
352 session msg	15	DC	DC	DC DC								

xmit\_pr ivate msgi xmit\_clear map\_msgl private\_\_i map\_msgl map\_msgl Table 2: TEST SEQUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE Xmit priv xmit clear xmit ate\_logica logical clear | l\_msg1 msg1 private msg<sub>I</sub> sts\_ msg<sub>I</sub> 2020 2020 2020  $\substack{\text{outbuf}_{\mathbf{I}}\\(1,2)}$ MEDIUM, Transfer Š 353 co\_trans\_msg 354 clnp\_msg 355 llc\_msg 356 msg\_sent Transition 376 

x.DA.x.x T,DA,x,x,x K,DA,K,K A,DA,X,X,X Hc\_ msg<sub>1</sub> Table 2: TEST SEQUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE (CONTINUED) T,DA,x,x,x x,X,X,X clnp\_ msg<sub>l</sub> x,DA,x,x,x is/is msgī x,DA,x,x,x es/is msg\_ cl\_trans\_ msg<sub>l</sub> T,DA,x,F,F,T co trans\_ msg<sub>l</sub> x,DA,x,T,F,F,x x,DA,x,F,T,F,x A,DA,A,F.F.T,A session\_ msg<sub>I</sub> A,DA,A,A,A x,DA,x,x,x x,DA,x,x,x presen tation msg<sub>1</sub> х,ДА,х,х,х x,DA,x,x,x x,DA,x,x,x rose\_ msg<sub>1</sub> cmise\_ msg<sub>I</sub> smase\_ msg<sub>1</sub> acse msg<sub>1</sub> 21 22 23 24 25 26 xDaara 18 x.DA,x.x.x 0 x.DA.x.x.x ftam\_ msg<sub>I</sub>

r,DA,x,x,x x.DA,x,x,x x,DA,x,x,x lic\_ msg<sub>1</sub> Table 2: TEST SEQUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE (CONTINUED) x,DA.x.x,x clnp\_ msg<sub>I</sub> x.X.x.x is/is msg<u>ī</u> x,DA,x,x,x х, Г. А. х, х, х es/is msgī cl\_trans\_ msg<sub>l</sub> co trans msg<sub>1</sub> a,DA,a,T,F,F,a x,DA,x,F,T,F,x x,DA,x,F.F.T,x A,DA,X,T,F.F,X session\_ msg<sub>I</sub> x,1)A,x,x A.D.A.A.A.A x,x,x,AC,x x,x,x,ACl,x presen tation msg<sub>1</sub> 1,DA,1,1,1 x.DA,x,x,x x,DA,x,x,x x,DA,x,x,x rose\_ msg<sub>1</sub> cmise\_msg1 A.I.A.A.L. smase\_ msg<sub>1</sub> x.f.A.x.x 1,DA,1,1,1 1,DA,1,1,1 r,DA,r,r acse msg<sub>1</sub> ftam\_ msg<sub>i</sub>

3

38 39

Table 2: TEST SEOTIENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE (CONTINUED)

								100			111101	7)
ftam	acse	smase	cmise	rose		session	co trans_	cl_trans_	es/is_	is/is	clnp	llc
igsm	msgı		msgi		msgl	lgsw	IBsui	msgi	msgi	msgī	$msg_1$	msgı
. 65												
99												
89		1.DA,1.1.1										
69			x,DA,x,x,s									
70				A,DA,X,X,X								
71					x,DA,x,x,x							
72						x,X,X,AU,x						
73							A,DA,A,F,T,F,x					
74										х.х.х.х		
2.2												x,X,x,x,X
9/												
7.1												
78		x,DA,x,x,x										
6/			x,X,X,A(1,x									
80				x,DA,x,x,x								
81					х.ДА,х,х,х							
82						x,DA,x,x						
83							a,DA,a,F,F,T,a					
*											A.DA.K.K.	
85												x,DA,x,x,x
98												
87												
<b>X</b> 8												
89 x.DA.x.x.x												
06					х,Г)А.х.х.х							
91						x,t,x,x,x						
92							a,DA,a,T,F.F,a					
43									1,DA,1,1,1			
94												х.ЮА,х,х,х
95												
96												

Table 2: TEST SEQUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE (CONTINUED)

				100			TO THE TOTAL	Table 2: 1EST SECUENCE FOR THE OST I NOTICE (CONTINUED)	NOT THE	(00)	LAINOE	171
ftam	acse	smase		rose_		session	co trans	cl_trans_	es/is_	si/si	clnp	llc_
msgi	msg <sub>1</sub>	msg <sub>l</sub>	msg <sub>I</sub>		msg <sub>1</sub>	ınsgı	msgi	msgi	msgi	msgī	ınsgı	msgl
67												
98 x.DA.x.x.x												
66					x,DA,x,x,x							
100						x,DA,x,x,x						
101							x,DA.x,F,T.F,x					
102										A.D.A.X.X		
103												x,DA,x,x
104												
105												
106												
107.DA.x.x												
108					х Д.А.к.х х							
109						x,DA,x,x,x						
110							a,DA,a F.F.T,a					
111											x,DA,x,x,	
112												A,DA,x.x.a
113												
114												
115												
116	x,DA,x,x,x											
117					x,DA,x,x							
118						x,DA,x,x,x						
119							x,DA,x,T,F,F,x					
120									1,DA.x.x,x			
121												x,DA,x,x,x
122												
123												
124												
125	x,DA,x,x,x											
126					x,DA,x,x,x							
127						x,DA,x,x,x						
128							x.DA,x,F,T,F,x					

x,DA,x,x x,DA,x,x,x K,DA,K,K,R llc msg<sub>l</sub> Table 2: TEST SEQUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE (CONTINUED) x,x,x,AC,x clnp\_ msg<sub>1</sub> x.f.A.a.x is/is msgī A,DA,A,A,A es/is msg\_ cl\_trans\_ msg<sub>l</sub> X,DA,x,T,F,F,x A.DA.A.F.F.T.A x,DA,x,F,T,F,x co trans msg<sub>1</sub> session\_ msg<sub>1</sub> x,DA,x,x,x x,DA,x,x,x 1,DA,1,1,1 presen tation msg<sub>1</sub> x,DA,x,x,x x,DA,x,x,x x,DA,x,x,x x,DA,x,x,x x,DA,x,x rose\_ msg<sub>1</sub> x,DA,x,x,z cmise msg<sub>1</sub> x,DA.x,x,x A,DA,R,K,X 1,DA,1,1,1 smase\_ msg<sub>1</sub> x,DA,x,x,x acse msg<sub>l</sub> ftam msg<sub>1</sub> 35 155 158 169 169 140 145 146 ಶ≘≘ 132 135 139 142 ₹<u>₹</u> 147 <del>2</del> 149 153 138 141 150 151 152 154

Table 2: TEST SEOTIENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE (CONTINUED)

			ĺ	İ						,		(2)
fram msg.	acse msg <sub>1</sub>	smase_ msg <sub>1</sub>	cmise_ msg <sub>1</sub>	rose msg <sub>1</sub>	presen tation msg <sub>1</sub>	session msg <sub>I</sub>	co trans msg <sub>l</sub>	cl_trans_ msg <sub>i</sub>	es/is msg_	is/is msgī	clnp_ msg <sub>I</sub>	llc_ msg <sub>1</sub>
161												x,Y,X,X,X
162												
163												
164												
165		r'r'r'YQ'1										
166			c,x,x,AQ,x									
167				x,DA,x,x		-						
168					x,DA,x,x,x							
169						1,DA,1,1,1						
170							a,DA,x,F,F,T,x					
171											x,DA,x,x,x	
172												x,DA,x,x,x
173												
174												
175												
176												
1773.DA.x.x.												
178					x,DA,x,x,x							
179						1,DA,1,1,1						
180							x,DA,x,T,F,F,x					
181									x,X,X,X			
182												x,DA,x,x
183												
184												
185												
186												
187x.DA.x.x.x												
188					x,X,X,A,X,X							
189						1,DA,1,1,1						
<u>8</u>			İ				a,DA,a,F,T,F,a					
191			1							х,х,х,х,х		
192				1								х,ГУА,х,х,х

Table 2: TEST SEQUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE (CONTINUED)

				Ī	I							,
ftam msg <sub>1</sub>	acse	smase_ msg <sub>l</sub>	cmise msg <sub>I</sub>	rose_ msg_	presen tation msg <sub>1</sub>	session msg <sub>I</sub>	co trans_ msg <sub>1</sub>	cl_trans_ msg <sub>l</sub>	es/is msg_	is/is msg_	cinp_ msg <sub>1</sub>	llc_ msg <sub>1</sub>
193												
3.												
195												
<del>8</del> 1												
1971.DA.x.x.												
198					x,DA,x,x,x							
18						x,DA,x,x,x						
200							x,DA,x,F,F,T,x					
201											x,DA,x,x,x	
202												x,DA,x,x,x
203												
204												
205												
206												
207	x,DA,x,x,x											
208					х,ДА,х,х,х							
209						x,DA,x,x,x						
210	i						x,DA,x,T,F,F,x					
211									х,ДА,х,х,х			
212												х,ДА,х,х,х
213												
214												
215												
216												
217	<b>х.ДА</b> ,х,х											
218					x,DA,x,x,x							
219						x,x,x,AQ,x						
220							x,DA,X,F,T,F,x					
221										л,ДА,х,х,я		
222												A,DA,A,A
223												
224												

Table 2: TEST SEQUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE (CONTINUED)

										,		
ftam msg <sub>1</sub>	acse msg <sub>1</sub>	smase_ msg <sub>1</sub>	cmise msg <sub>1</sub>	rose_ msg <sub>1</sub>	presen tation msg.	session_ msg <sub>1</sub>	co trans msg <sub>l</sub>	cl_trans_ msg <sub>1</sub>	es/is msg <sub>1</sub>	is/is msg_	clnp_ msg.	lic msg <sub>l</sub>
200				Т	Т							
226			İ									
227	x,DA,x,x,x											
228					x,DA,x,x,x							
229						x,DA,x,x,x						
230							x,DA,X,F.F.T,x					i
231											x,DA.x,x,x	
232												х,ДА,х,х,х
233												
234												
235												
236												
237		r'r'r'YQ'x										
238			r.DA.x.x.x									
239				x,DA,x,x,x								
240					x,DA,x,x,x							
241						x,x,x,AQ,x						
242							x,DA,x,T,F,F,x					
243									x,DA.x,x,x			
244												x,x,x,AQ,x
245												
246												
247												
248												
249		x,DA,x,x										
250			a,DA.a,a,									
251				x,DA,x,x,x								
252					x,x,x,x							
253						x,DA,x,x,x						
254							x,DA,x,F,T,F,x					
255										х,ДА.х,х,х		
256												t.DA.x.x.x

x,DA,x,x,x x,x,x,x x,DA.x.x Table 2: TEST SEQUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE (CONTINUED) 1,DA,1,x,x clnp\_ msg<sub>1</sub> х.ЮА.х,х,х is/is msgī x,DA,x,x,x es/is msg<sub>1</sub> cl\_trans\_ msg<sub>1</sub> x,DA,x,F,F,T,x x.DA.x,T.F.F.x A.DA,A,F,T,F,X co trans msg<sub>1</sub> session\_ msg<sub>1</sub> x,DA,x,x,x x,DA,x,x,x x,DA,x,x,x presen tation msg<sub>1</sub> x,DA,x,x,x x.DA,x,x,xx,DA,x,x,x x,DA,x,x,x rose\_ msg<sub>1</sub> cmise\_msg1 t,DA,x,x,z smase\_ msg<sub>1</sub> x,X,x,x,x acse msg<sub>1</sub> 272x.DA.x.x. 281x.DA.x. fram\_ msg<sub>1</sub> 258 259 260 262 263 264 265 265 276 282 287 287 2887 2887 266 897 278 283 280 282 197 112

Table 2: TEST SEQUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE (CONTINUED)

												í
ftam	acse	smase_ msgr	cmise msg <sub>r</sub>	rose	presen tation	session msg.	co trans_ msgl	cl_trans_ msg <sub>l</sub>	es/is msg <sub>1</sub>	is/is msgī	clnp	llc_ msg <sub>i</sub>
900	i			T	Т	5					ia	
789												
290 a.DA.a.x	×											
291					x,DA,x,x,x							
292						x,DA,x,x,x						
293							x,DA,x,F.F.T,x					
292											x,DA,x,x,x	
295												A,DA,X,X,X
296												
297												
298												
299	x,DA,x,x,x		****									
300					x,X,x,x,X							
301						x,DA,x,x,x						
302							x,DA,x,T,F,F,x					
303									х,ДА,х,х			
304												х,ДА,х,х,х
305												
306												
307												
308	x,X,X,AQ,x											
309					х,ДА,х,х							
310						х,ДА,х,х						
311							x,DA,x,F,T,F,x					
312										x,DA,x.x,x		
313												х,ДА,х.х,х
314												
315												
316												
317	A.DA.X.X											
318					х, ДА, х, х, х							
319						а,DА.х,х,х						
320							a,DA,a,F,F,T,a					

Table 2: TEST SEQUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE (CONTINUED)

	I											
ftam	acse	smase	cmise	rose		session	co trans	-sut	es/is_	is/is	clnp	llc_
msg <sub>1</sub>	msgi	msgl	msgi		msg <sub>1</sub>	msgi	msgl	msgi	msgi	msgī	msgi	msgı
321											x,X,X,A,X,x	
322												<b>х,ДА,х,х</b>
323												
324												
325												
326		x,DA,x,x,x										
327			r,DA,x.x,y									
328				x,DA,x,x,s								
329					х,ДА,х,х,х							
330						x,DA,x,x,x						
331						·	x,DA,x,T,F,F,x					
332									x,DA,x,x,x			
333												x,DA.x,x,x
334												
335												
336												
337		x,DA,x,x,x										
338			x,DA,x,x,x									
339				x,DA,x,x,x								
340					x,DA,x,x,x							
341						x,DA,x,x,x						
342							x,DA,x,F,T,F,x					
343										x,DA,x,x,x		
344												а,DА.х,х,л
345												
346												
347												
348		x,DA,x,x,r										
349			x,DA.x,x,x									
350				x,DA,x,x,x								
351					х.В.А.я.х							
352						х,ЮА.я.я.						

x,DA,x,x,x lic msg<sub>1</sub> Table 2: TEST SEQUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE (CONTINUED) x.DA.x.x clnp\_ msg<sub>1</sub> is/is msgī es/is msg<sub>1</sub> cl\_trans\_ msg<sub>l</sub> co trans msg<sub>1</sub> 1.DA.1.F.F.T.1 session msg<sub>I</sub> presen tation msg<sub>1</sub> rose\_ msg<sub>1</sub> cmise\_ smase\_ msg<sub>1</sub> acse msg<sub>1</sub> fram msg<sub>1</sub> 354 355 356 357 358 658 360 362 363 365 367 367 368 367 374 375 376 377 378 

Table 2: TEST SEQUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE (CONTINUED)

		10		10 1071	Table 2: 11531 SEQUENCE FOR THE OST INOFILE (CONTINOED)	DE VAN E		INVER	10000		
MEDIUMO	Transfer <sub>O</sub>	outbufo (1,2)	sts_ msgo	private msgo	xmit_priv ate_logica l_msgo	v xmit clear xr a logical cl msgo m	nit ear sgo	xmit clear xmit map_msgo private	xmit private map_msgo	xmit_pr ivate msgo	ftam_ msgo
1 DC	DC	od od									
	DC	od od									
3 DC	T,x,SA,x,x	ou Ø									
4 DC	T,x,SA,x	$\overline{DC}$	Ø								
S DC	T,x,SA,F,F,T	oa oa									
od 9	T.x,SA.x,x	DC DC									
7 DC	T,x,SA,x,x	<b>3</b> 0 <b>3</b> 0									
Ø 8	DC	oa oa									
	x,SA,F,F,T,F,F,x	oa oa					Ø				
10 DC	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									Ø
11 DC	х,х,ЅА,х,х	DC DC									
12 DC	х,х,ЅА.х,х	oc oc									
13 DC	x,x,SA,T,F,F,x	oa oa									
14 DC	х,х,SА,х,х	DC DC									
15 pc	х,х,ЅА,х,х	oc oc		·							
Ø 91	DC	DC DC									
17 18	x,SA.F.F.T.F.F.x	DC DC					Ø				
18 DC	1,1,5A,1,1	DC DC									0
19 DC	я, х, S.А. х, х	DC DC									
20 DC	x,x,SA,x,x	Dr. DC									
21 DC	x,x,SA,F,T,F,x	DC DC									
22 DC	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
24 Ø	DC	DC DC									
25 DC	x,SA.F.F.T.F.F.x	DC DC					Ø				
	х,х,ЅА,х,х	DC DC									Ø
	х,х,ЅА,х,х	DC DC									
28 DC	х,х,ЅА,х,х	DC DC									
29 DC	x,x,SA,F,F,T,x	1									
	х,х,ЅА,х,х	il									
	я,я,ЅА,я,я	IX IX									
32 Ø	ÞC	ίκ. Ικ.									
											I

Table 2: TEST SEQUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE (CONTINUED)

			outbuf	sts	private_	ate looica	kmit clear	ı	xmit clear	kmit	xmit_pr	ftam
M	MEDIUMO	${ m Transfer}_{ m O}$	(1,2)	$\mathbf{m}\bar{\mathbf{s}}_{0}$		l_msg <sub>O</sub>	msgo_		map_msgo	map_msgo	msgo_	msgo
133	DC	x,SA,F,F,T,F,x	DC DC					Ø				
34	DC	1,1,SA,1,1	DC DC									
35	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
36	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC							i		
37	ъс	x,x,SA,T,F,F,x	DC DC									
38	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
39	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
40	Ø	20	DC DC					Ø				
41	DC	x,SA,F.F.F.T.F.s	DC DC									
42	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
43	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
4	DC	х,х,ЅА,х,х	DC DC									
45	DC	x,x,SA,F,T,F,x	oc oc									
46	DC	х,х,SA,х,х	oa oa									
147	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
48	0	ЭC	DC DC									
49	DC	x,SA,FF,F,T,F,x	DC DC					Ø				
20	DC	1,1,SA,1,1	DC DC									
51	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	oc oc									
52	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
53	DC	x,x,SA,F,F,T,x	DC DC									
¥	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
55	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	oc oc									
98	Ø	DC	DC DC									
23	DC	x,SA,F,F,F,T,x	DC DC					Ø				
28	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
89	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
8	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
19	DC	х,х,SA,х,х	DC DC									
62	ΣC	х.х.ЅА.л.х	DC DC									
63	IX.	x,x,SA,T.F.F.x	IX, IX.									
5	.×.	я,к.ЅА,я.я	IX. IX.									

Table 2: TEST SEQUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE (CONTINUED)

				l			White Minney						I
			Ontpnto	Om	sts	private	ate logica	ate logica logical clear		xmit clear private	orivate	ivate	ftam_
M	MEDIUMO	Transfer <sub>O</sub>	7,1)		msgo		l msgo	mšgo –		map_msg0	map_msgo	msgō	msgo
59	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	<b>3</b> 0	DC									
99	Ø	DC	<b>3</b> 0	ж									
<i>L</i> 9	Ж	x,SA,F,F,F,F,T,x	20	ж					0				
89	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	20	ЭC									
69	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	20	ж									
0/	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	20	DC									
17	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	20	20									
7.5	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	20	ЭG									
13	DC	x,x,SA,F,T,F,x	20	ЭC									
74	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	ΣC	DC									
22	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	ы	DC									
92	Ø	рс	æ	æ									
$\iota\iota$	DC	x,SA,F,F,F,T,x	30	ЭG					0				
81	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	ж	ж									
66	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	20	ЭG									
08	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	ĸ	DC									
81	DC	х,х,ЅА,х,х	20	ЭC									
82	DC	1,1,SA,1,1	м	ΩC									
83	DC	x,x,SA,F.F,T,x	20	$\Sigma$									
84	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	20	20									
58	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	м	ЪС									
98	Ø	DC	20	DC									
87	DC	A.SA.F.T.F.F.R	20	DC				Ø					
88	DC	x,SA,F,T,T,F,F,x	ĸ	DC						0			
86	ſĸ.	x,x,SA,x,x	ă	ă									Ø
06	DC	1,1,SA,1,1	X	ж									
16	ίχ.	х,х,ЅА,х,х	×	DC.									
92	ίχ'	x,x,SA,T,F,F,x	ă	DC									
93	.x.	х, х, т, . А, х, х	Ճ	ВC									
8	١χ.	х,х.ЅА.х,х	≃	ĭ									
5	Ø	.א	≊	ž									
95	ĽΧ.	x,SA,ETT,EEx	ž.	ž.				Ø					

Ø 0 xmit\_pr ivate msgo Table 2: TEST SEQUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE (CONTINUED) xmit\_clear map\_msgo private\_ map\_msgo Ø Ø Ø Xmit\_priv xmit\_clear xmit\_ate\_logica logical clear\_l\_msgo msgo Ø Ø Ø private msgo outbufo sts\_ (1,2) msgo 20 20 20 20 20 20 22 DC S S 88 2 8 2 2 2 2 DС 20 ЭC 2 DC 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 DC 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 20 DC ă x,SA,F,T,F,T,F,x x,SA,F,T,F,F,x x,SA,F,T,T,F,F,x x.SA.F.T.F.T.F.x x,SA,F,T,F,T,F,x A,SA,F,T,F,T,F,X Transfer<sub>0</sub> 1,1,SA,TF,F,1 1,1,SA,1,1 x,SA,F,T,T,FF, x,x,SA,F,T,F,x X.X.SA.F.F.T.X x.x.SA.F.T.F.x x,x,SA,x,x 1,1,SA,1,1 1,1,5A,1,1 x,x,SA.x,x x,x,SA,x,x 1,1,SA,1,1 1,1,SA,1,1 x,x,SA,x,x x,x,SA,x,x r,x,SA,r,x 1,1,SA,1,1 x,x,SA,x,x x,x,SA,x,x x,x,SA,x,x A,X,SA,X,X 1,1,SA.1,1 x,x,SA,x,x 2 2 8 **MEDIUM<sub>0</sub>** 2 2 2 222 808 Z ĸ 2 2 222 8 2 ä 8 DC DC DC 원원물 8 2 DC X Ø Ø <u>≅</u>5

111

읨 117 118 119 120 123

122

121

125 126 127

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<u>⊡</u>

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[≌ 108 8

Table 2: TEST SEOUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE (CONTINUED)

		7						1 11/11	Table 2: 11531 SEQUENCE FOR THE OST INOTHE (CONTINUED)	IIVOED)	
MEDIUMO	Transfer <sub>O</sub>	$\binom{\text{outbuf}_{O}}{(1,2)}$	sts_ msgo	private_ msgo_	xmit_priv ate_logica l_msgo	xmit clear logical msgo	xmit clear msg <sub>0</sub>	xmit clear map_msgo	cmit private nap msgo	xmit_pr ivate_ msgo_	ftam_ msgo
129 pc	1,1,SA,1,1	DC DC									
		og og									
131 Ø	20	od od									
	x,SA,F,T,F,T,F,x	oa oa				Ø	İ				
133 DC	x,SA,F,T,F,T,F,x	od od						Ø			
134 DC	1,1,SA,1,1	od od									
	x,x,SA,x,x	<b>20</b> 20									
136 DC	x,x,SA,x,x	oa oa									
Н	x,x,SA,F,F,T,x										
138 DC	и,5А,и,и	od od									
	x,x,SA,x,x	og og									
	DC	od od									
141 DC	x,SA,F,T,F,F,T,x					0					
	x,SA,F,T,F,F,T,x	od od						Ø			
	1,1,SA,1,1	oa oa									
	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
145 DC	х,х,ЅА,х,х	DC DC									
146 DC	x,x,SA,x,x	OC DC									
	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
148 DC	x,x,SA,T,F,F,x	od od									
149 DC	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
H	DC	DC DC									
152 DC	x,SA,F,T,F,F,T,x	od od				Ø					
153 DC	x,SA,F,T,F,F,T,x	od od						0			
154 DC	r'r'SY'r'r	od od									
155 DC	x,x,SA,x,x	oa oa									
156 pc	x,x,SA,x,x	od od									
	л,х,ЅА,х,х	oc oc									
158 DC	х,х,ЅА,х,х	DC DC									
	A,A,SA,F,T,F,X	DC. DC.									
160 DC	л.х.SА.я.х	DC DC									

msg<sub>0</sub> ftam Ø Ø Table 2: TEST SEQUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE (CONTINUED) xmit\_pr ivate msgo map\_msgo xmit clear xmit map\_msgo private Ø Ø Ø xmit\_priv xmit\_clear xmit\_ ate\_logica logical clear\_ l\_msgo msgo msgo Ø 0 Ø private msg<sub>0</sub> Ø Ø outbufo sts (1,2) msgo 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 DC DC DC DC DC 20 20 20 20 20 20 DC DC 20 20 DC DC DC DC DC DC 20 DC DC DC DC DC DC DC DC 8 20 2 x,SA,F,T,F,F,T,x x,SA,T,T,F,F,x x,SA,T,T,F,F,x A,SA,T,T,F,F,R A.SA,T,T,F,F,X x,SA,T,T,F,F,x 1,SA,F,T,F,T,1 x,SA,T,T,F,F,x x,x,SA,F,F,T,x x,x,SA,x,x x,x,SA,F,T,F,x x,x,SA,TFF,x Transfer<sub>0</sub> x,x,SA,x,x x,x,SA,x,x x,x,SA,x,x I,I,SA,I,I x,x,SA,x,x x,x,SA,x,x x,x,SA,x,x x,x,SA,x,x I,X,SA,X,X x,x,SA,x,x x,x,SA,x,x x,x,SA,x,x x,x,SA,x,x x,x,SA,x,x x,x,SA,x,x x,x,SA,x,x x,x,SA,x,x 20 8 MEDIUMO 8888888 Z Ø 2 2 2 Z 2 2 2 2 Ħ 2 8 ă 2 2 Z 2 2 8 Z 0 8 8 Ø 991 <u> 25</u> 170 921 163 163 167 <u>≋</u> 175 179 182 184 185 186 188 061 061 192 172 174 180 83 187 161 171 177 181 <u>5</u>

Table 2: TEST SEQUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE (CONTINUED)

												I
			outbufo	sts	private_ msg	≥ ਤ	xmit clear logical	1, 1	xmit clear	kmit private	xmit_pr ivate	ftam
MEL	MEDIUMO	Iransiero	(7,1)	msgo	00	l_msg <sub>0</sub>		msgo	r	map msgo	msgo	OSem
193	0	DC	ञ्च ञ्च									
18	DC	x,SA,T,T,F,F,x			0							
195	DC	x,SA,T,T,T,F,F,x				0						
136	DC	1,SA,T,T,T,F,F,1	od od							Ø		
197	DC	1,1,5A,1,1										Ø
861	DC	I,X,SA,X,X	DG DG									
199	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	<b>30 30</b>									
200	DC	1,1,SA,F,F,T,x	<b>30</b> 30									
201	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	<b>20</b> 20									
202	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
203	Ø	DC	<b>30 30</b>									
204	DC	x,SA,T,T,F,T,F,x	oa oa		Ø							
205	DC	x,SA,T,T,F,T,F,x	oa oa			Ø						
206	DC	x,SA,T,T,F,T,F,x	oa oa							Ø		
207	DC	I,X,SA,X,X	od od									
208	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
209	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
210	DC	x,x,SA,T,F,F,x	oa oa									
211	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	oa oa									
212	DC	1,1,SA,1,1	oa oa									
213	Ø	DC	DC DC									
214	DC	x,SA,T,T,F,T,F,x	od od		0							
215	DC	x,SA,T,F,T,F,x	3G 3G			0						
216	DC	x,SA,T,T,F,T,F,x	DC DC							Ø		
217	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
218	DC	х,х,ЅА,х,х	DC DC									
219	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
220	DC	x,x,SA,F,T,F,x	DC DC									
221	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	oc oc									
222	DX.	х,х,ЅА,х,х										
223	Ø	DC										
224	Ŋ,	x.SA.T.T.F.T.F.x	3d 3d		Ø							

able 2: TEST SEQUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE (CONTINUED)

ā,	So msgo	L					-	-						-					L	_	-		_		-	_		-				
xmit		L			L	L				-													  -									
xmit_ private	map_msgo		Ø										Ø												Ø							
xmit_clear	map_msgo																															
xmit clear	msgo_																															
xmit clear xmit logical clea	msgo_																															
xmit_priv ate logica	I_msgo msgo	0										Ø												0								
private	msg0										0												0									
sts	msgo																															
oùthuío	(1,2)	DC DC	DC DC	od od	DC DC	OQ 0Q	og og	oa oa	ञ्च ञ्च	oa oa	DC DC	og og	od od	od od	od od	30 30	ञ्च ञ्च	DC DC	od od	od od	od od	DC DC	oa oa	od od	og og	od od	DC DC	oc oc	oc oc	oc oc	DC DC	ואל ואל
•		x,SA,T,T,F,T,F,x	x,SA,T,T,F,T,F,x	x,x,SA,x,x	x,x,SA,x,x	x,x,SA,x,x	x,x,SA,F.F.T,x	x,x,SA,x,x	x,x,SA,x,x	20	x,SA,T,T.F.F.T.x	x,SA,T,T,F,F,T,x	x,SA,T,T,F,F,T,x	x,x,SA,x,z	x,x,SA,x,x	x,x,SA,x,x	x,x,SA,x,x	я, я, S.А, я, я	x,x,SA,T,F,F,x	x,x,SA,x,x	х,х,5А,х,х	DC	x,SA,T,T,F,F,T,x	1,SA,T,T,F,F,T,x	x,SA,T,T,F,F,T,x	я, к. S.А, к. к	x,x,SA,x,x	л, л, S.А, л, л	x,x,SA,x,x	а, и, S.А, и, и	x,x,SA,F,T.F,x	\$4
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able 2: TEST SEOUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE (CONTINUED)

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267 DC	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
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271 DC	x,SA,T,F,T,F,F	oa oa								0	
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273 DC	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
274 DC	x,x,SA,x,z	DC DC									
	x,x,SA,T,FF,x	DC DC									
	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
277 DC	X,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
	DC	DC DC									
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280 DC	x,SA,T,F,T,F,F,x	DC DC								0	
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284 DC	x,x,SA,F,T,F,x	DC DC									
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Table 2: TEST SEOUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE (CONTINUED)

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290	DC	x,x,SA,x,x										Ø
291	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
292	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
293	DC	x,x,SA,F,F,T,x	oc oc									
294	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
295	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
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298	DC	x,SA,T,F,F,T,F,x	DC DC								Ø	
299	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
300	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
301	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	og og									
302	DC	x,x,SA,T,F,F,x	od od									
303	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	<b>30</b> 30									
304	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
305	0	DC	DC DC									
306	DC	x,SA,T,F,F,T,F,x			0							
307	DC	x,SA,T,F,F,T,F,x	DC DC								Ø	
308	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
309	DC	х,х,ЅА,х,х	DC DC									
310	DC	1,1,SA,1,1	DC DC									
311	DC	x,x,SA,F,T,F,x	DC DC									
312	DC	1,1,SA,1,1	DC DC									
313	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
314	0	DC	DC DC									
315	DC	x,SA,T,F,F,T,F,x	DC DC		Ø							
316	DC	x,SA,T,F,F,T,F,x	DC DC								Ø	
317	DC	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
318	DC.	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
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320	ΙΚ	x,x,SA,F.F.T,x	DC DC									

Table 2: TEST SEOUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE (CONTINUED)

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323 Ø	DC	oa oa									
324 DC	x,SA,TFF.F.T.x	od od		0							
	x,SA,T,F,F,F,T,x	od od								0	
	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
	x,x,SA,x,x	oa oa									
328 DC	x,x,SA,x,x	oa oa									
	r,r,SA,r,r	oa oa									
330 DC	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
331 pc	x,x,SA,T,F,F,x	DC DC									
332 DC	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
	DC	oc oc									
	x.SA,T,F,F,F,T,x	oa oa		0							
336 DC	x,SA,T,F,F,F,T,x	DC DC								0	
	х,х,ЅА,х,х	DC DC									
338 DC	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
339 DC	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
341 pc	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
342 DC	x,x,SA,F,T,F,x	DC DC									
	1,1,SA,1,1	DC DC									
	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
345 0	DC	DC DC									
346 DC	x,SA,T.F.F.F.T.x	DC DC		Ø							
347 DC	x,SA,T,F,F,F,T,x	DC DC								0	
348 DC	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
349 DC	х,х,SA,х,х	DC DC									
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351 pc	х,х,ЅА,х,х	DC DC									
352 DC	x,x,SA,x,x	DC DC									
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		Ta	ble 2:	FEST SE	QUENC	E FOR T	HE OSI	PROFIL	Table 2: TEST SEQUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE (CONTINUED	INCED)	
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353 DC	x,x,SA,F.F.T,x	DC DC							00		
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21						0							5
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23											0		18
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81 15 16 9 0 inbuf Table 2: TEST SEQUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE (CONTINUED) lk\_ msgo Ø Ø Ø clnp\_ msgo Ø is/is msgō Ø es/is msgō Ø cl\_trans\_ msgo presen session co trans\_ tation msgo msgo Ø Ø Ø 0 Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø rose\_ msgo 0 Ø cmise\_ Ø Ø smase\_ msgo\_ Ø Ø acse msgo

91 18 14 15 16 18 14 16 2 9 15 <u>«</u> 14 9 o |∞ 0 6 0 ∞ inbuf Table 2: TEST SEQUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE (CONTINUED) lic\_ msgo Ø Ø 0 chp\_ msg<sub>0</sub> Ø is/is msgo Ø es/is msgō Ø cl\_trans\_ msgo co trans msgo Ø 0 Ø Ø session tation msgo Ø ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø 0 rose\_ msgo cmise\_ Smase\_ msg<sub>0</sub> **Ogsu** Ø 0 acse 124 125 127 128 102 106 108 601 811 107 119 120 122 123 121

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2 2 8 14 15 91 0 7 8 ∞ 9 4 0 6 inbuf Table 2: TEST SEQUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE (CONTINUED) lic\_ msgo Ø Ø Ø chp\_ msgo Ø is/is msgo Ø es/is msgō Ø cl\_trans\_ msgo tation msgo msgo msgo Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø rose\_ msgo Ø cmise\_msg<sub>0</sub> Ø smase 0 acse msg<sub>0</sub> <u>691</u> 891 170 175 176 179 <u>≅</u> ≅ 172 174 177 180 182 171 181

14 15 9 4 18 5 <del>2</del> 5 16 ∞ 10 14 15 16 0 8 , 4 0 ∞ inbuf Table 2: TEST SEQUENCE FOR THE OSI PROFILE (CONTINUED) ||k\_ ||nsgo Ø Ø Ø clnp\_ msg<sub>0</sub> Ø is/is msgō Ø es/is msgō Ø cl\_trans\_ msgo co trans Ø Ø Ø session Insgo Ø Ø Ø presen tation msgo\_ Ø Ø Ø rose\_ msgo cmise msg<sub>0</sub> smase\_ msgo\_ acse msgo Ø Ø 200 200 200 201 201 201 201 220 221 222 223 224 217 <u>इ</u>€ 202

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